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I A IR transportation from its infancy was intimately involved with postal 
service. The possibility of using aircraft to speed up mail communication 
and improve service in areas where ground facilities were slow or unsatisfac­
tory was advanced in the first decade of powered flight, and experimental or 
occasional airmail services existed before World War I. 1 The war stimulated 
aircraft development in ways that improved load-carrying ability and reli­
ability and held out the promise that aircraft could improve the speed of mail 
carriage even over terrain where ground transportation facilities were rela­
tively well developed. By the end of the war, the U.S. Post Office Depart­
ment was eager to begin airmail services, and development started in earnest 
in 1918. 
In the immediate postwar period, it was still impossible to carry mail in 
aircraft at costs and rates which would permit profitable operation. This 
fact, coupled with strong interest in the military potential of air transport, 
led to government operation of airmail carriage. These efforts were techni­
cally successful, and by 1925, transcontinental service, including overnight 
New York-Chicago service, was being operated by the Post Office Depart­
ment on a regular basis.' The service was by no means self-supporting, 
however. One estimate places the excess of government expenditures over 
airmail revenues in the period 1918-1927 at about $14,000,000.3 
* I wish to thank for their cooperation the Air Transport Association of America, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board, the staffs of the Senate and House Committees on Post Office and Civil 
Service, the United States Postal Service, and Miss Beatrice Aitchison. Support by the Law and 
Economics Program of the University of Chicago made this article possible and is hereby 
gratefully acknowledged. None of the cooperating or supporting organizations or individuals 
are in any way responsible for the views expressed in this article, nor did any try to influence it. 
I am especially indebted to Professor Ronald H. Coase for his tolerance and persistence. 
1 A discussion of the early history of airmail transportation is to be found in Paul T. David, 
The Economics of Air Mail Transportation (Brookings Inst 1934) [hereinafter cited as David]. 
2 In the first fiscal year of New York-Chicago overnight service, 94% of scheduled miles were 
actually flown, a remarkable record considering the then-existing level of aeronautical technol­
ogy. 
3 This figure, derived from David, ignores capital equipment auctioned off or transferred to 
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By the mid-l 920's, when proposals were first introduced into the Congress 
to turn transportation of airmail over to private contractors, air transport 
economics had improved somewhat. Ton-mile costs were declining and 
speed and reliability, and thus the value of the services offered, were improv­
ing. Moreover, technical development was very rapid during the twenties, 
leading entreprepeurs to hope for very substantial improvement in the near 
future. As of 1925, however, payload had to be relatively light and of high 
per-pound value to be at all suitable for carriage by air. Given the discom­
fort, danger, and marginal speed advantage of the airplane, few passengers 
were willing to pay rates that would cover costs. Carriage of freight was out 
of the question, for all practical purposes. Mail was low in weight, high in 
value, and tendered by a government interested in promoting air transport 
and thus increasingly willing to arrange for airmail carriage at rates which 
exceeded the revenues that the Post Office could attract by offering airmail 
service. The components for constructing a special relationship between 
Congress, the Post Office Department, and the air carriers were all present 
by the 1925-1927 period. By 1930, the basic relationship had been established. 
The first attempt by the government to turn airmail carriage over to 
private contractors4 was designed to avoid any subsidy by limiting payments 
to carriers to 80 per cent of revenues attributable to the mail they carried. 
The attribution requirement necessarily produced a complicated rate struc­
ture and presented other administrative difficulties. In addition, the non­
deficit provisions made it very unlikely that contractors �ould operate profit­
ably, and few bids were received under the original system. In 1926, before 
many of even these few bidders had commenced service, the Act was 
amended.' The amendment was presented as a way of simplifying the rate 
structure by eliminating the revenue attribution requirement, but it also had 
the effect of permitting operation at a deficit by permitting payment on a 
poundage basis only generally related to revenue. 6 Airmail postage rates 
were reduced in early 192 7, raising revenues to the carriers from the result-
other government agencies when the Post Office ceased operations. Since much of the equip· 
ment was acquired as war surplus and transferred on a non·market basis, its value, which 
should be deducted from the net cost to the government, is difficult to determine. David 
estimates that the capital equipment was worth $2 ,000,000 at most at the time of its disposition. 
Using this figure, he estimates a total loss to the government of $12,000,000 in connection with 
establishing and running airmail services from 1918 through 1927. David 48-49. 
4 Kelly Air Mail Act of 1925, ch. 128, 43 Stat. 805. 
5 Act of June 3, 1926, ch. 460, 44 Stat. 692. 
6 The Amendment provided that a maximum contract rate per rout e be set at a level equal to 
the old levels on routes of 1,000 miles. However, postal rates could be lowered without affecting 
contract rates, and routes shorter than 1 ,000 miles could be operated at the same payment level 
as thousand-mile routes, thus resulting in per-mile rates that increased as distance decreased. 
Both postal rate decreases and short routes widened the spread between cost to the Post Office 
Department and revenues received. 
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ing increase in volume and simultaneously increasing the size of the subsidy 
by reducing revenues to the Post Office for each unit of mail carried. The 
volume of mail tendered was still low, however, and costs of operation high . 
Even with the subsidy, few contractors operated profitably. 
In 1928, further changes were made in the Air Mail Act which greatly 
increased the level of subsidy, created protected rights for airmail carriers, 
and set the stage for an enormous expansion in the degree of government 
involvement in the market for air transportation. The 1928 Amendment' 
permitted halving the airmail postage rate, greatly increasing the ma.ii vol­
ume. This inceased volume (95 per cent in the first month under the new rate') 
could be carried with the available capacity and therefore at virtually no extra 
cost to the carriers. Since contract rates were not renegotiated as con­
templated, many routes which had been unprofitable became bonanzas for 
their operators. In addition, the low postal rates and high contract payments 
created marvelous opportunities for self-help. A carrier could mail heavy 
objects around its route system, paying no more than $2 .00/lb. in postage and 
receiving payments ofup to $3.00/lb. David' reports cases of carriers rebating 
postage to shippers to encourage them to mail large loads. In one instance 
discussed at a later hearing on a Post Office Appropriation bill, a carrier paid a 
shipper to airmail 4,000 lbs. of lithographs from Niagara Falls to California. 
Postage was$6,000. The carrier received $25 ,000 from the Post Office to carry 
them.10 
As bountiful as this procedure was to many of the carriers, the 1928 
Amendment contained another provision which promised even greater 
long-term benefits. As a quid pro quo for contemplated reductions in com­
pensation (which never took place), the carriers were to exchange the con­
tract rights awarded b y  competitive bidding in the 1925-1927 period for 10-
year certificates conferring exclusive rights to carry mail over the routes 
covered, with rates to be determined by periodic negotiation with the Post­
master General.11 This provision was greatly sought after by the carriers, 
who justified it in infant industry terms. It was argued that the certificates 
would provide stability, permit further investment, promote the develop­
ment of air transportation, and prevent cessation of operations conducted at 
7 Act of May 17, 1928, ch. 603, 45 Stat. 594. 
8 David 82. 
9 David 85. 
10 David 85, at note 28. 
1 1  The maximum compensation payable under the 1928 Act was limited to the rates set by 
competitive bidding in the award of the original contracts. Given the rapidly improving 
technology of the period and the profits made in the 1928-1930 period, this limit was of little 
significance. Whatever significance it might have had was eliminated by the change in payment 
basis embodied in the Watres Act, note 13, infra. 
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a loss under competitive bidding.12 The combination of high compensation 
rates and franchises thus made airmail contracts the key to profitable opera­
tion of an airline, given the economics of airline operation at the time. 
Under the 1928 Amendment, even with its protective provisions, the Post 
Office Departrnent was still principally a buyer of services operated for 
postal benefit. Non-mail objectives nominally played no part in determin­
ing what services were to be offered and what compensation was to be paid. 
Walter F. Brown, Postmaster General in the new Hoover administration, 
was apparently more interested in the development of air transportation 
than he was in the carriage of airmail at the lowest possible cost to the 
Department, however. His efforts resulted in the passage of the Watres Act 
of 1930, t3 which changed postal airmail contracting from a method of pro­
curing airmail transportation services to a vehicle for promoting, shaping, 
and regulating the entire air transport industry. 
Brown's concerns are difficult to reconstruct, but appear to have included 
the following.14 Some airmail routes were being operated at a loss. Passenger 
lines were becoming more common, but virtually all were unprofitable. 
Some of these lines operated to cities that were situated between terminals 
already receiving airmail service from another carrier. Since only one con­
tract was awarded over a given route, intermediate cities served by carriers 
other than the airmail contractor could not receive airmail service, even 
though the capacity and facilities for the service were in place. Other lines 
competed with mail carriers over some routes, but not others, and the Post­
master General seemed unwilling to award contracts to these carriers while 
they were potential or actual competitors to existing contractors. Aggregat­
ing fragmented services, eliminating route overlaps, and ensuring that com­
petitors could not impede a carrier's opportunity to combine passenger and 
mail revenues apparently seemed to Brown the surest route to financial 
stability for the carriers and improved service to the public. In addition, he 
apparently worried about the risks of variability of traffic, and the effects of 
those risks on the willingness of contractors to invest in new equipment. It is 
not dear which of these perceptions and arguments were really important to 
Brown. What is indisputable is that Brown was very much interested in the 
development of passenger services, wanted to reduce competition and reor­
ganize the route structure, wanted to support the airlines during their de-
12 David 77-79. 
13 Act of April 29, 1930, ch, 223, 46 Stat. 259. 
14 David discusses Brown's objectives and concerns in a way that seems to reflect his own 
puzzlement over what Brown really believed (88-89), but emphasizes Brown's interest in sub­
sidizing the carriers and severely restricting competition. David 98-99, 108-119. S ee also, 
Lucille S. Keyes, Federal Control of Entry into Air Transport 62-31 67-8 (1951); Henry L. 
Smith, Airways: The History of Commercial Aviation in the United States 156 (1942). 
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velopment period, and saw airmail revenues as the instrument through 
which he could assist and shape the industry. 
The Watres Act provided for compensation "at fixed rates per mile for 
definite weight spaces,"" that is, for capacity offered rather than mail actu­
ally carried. It provided for initial award of contracts by competitive bid­
ding, but empowered the Postmaster General to issue a ten-year certificate to 
any bidder who had satisfactorily operated an airmail route for a period of 
not less than two years. Once tbe initial contract period was over, rates were 
to be fixed annually by the Postmaster General. Certificate holders had to 
comply with ... "all rules, regulations and orders that [might] be issued by 
the Postmaster General for meeting the needs of the postal service and 
adjusting mail operations to the advances in the art of flying and passenger 
transportation .... "16 (emphasis added]. The Post Office Department was 
no longer a mere customer. It had become patron and regulator. 
Brown lost no time in exercising every prerogative conferred on him by 
the Watres Act, in the process exercising a few that either exceeded his 
authority under the Act or in some cases simply contravened it. In a series of 
doubtful maneuvers ranging from attempts to establish new routes by using 
his route extension authority to conferences with the carriers in which mar­
kets were divided and bids were rigged, the Postmaster General rearranged 
the airline map.17 He established two new transcontinental routes and sev­
eral important north-south routes, in the process eliminating some existing 
competition and effectively preempting would-be new entrants. The carriers 
awarded the new routes were predecessor companies to those (American and 
TWA) who operate them today. In fact, the route awards of 1930 and the 
years immediately following established a basic distribution of companies 
and routes that was largely unchanged until the 1950's and which still under­
lies the trunkline system. The competitive bidding requirements of the stat­
ute were circumvented by a combination of arranged bids (with side pay­
ments in the form of purchases by successful bidders of some would-be 
competitors) and liberal interpretation by the Postmaster General of the 
requirement that successful bidders be "responsible." 
Brown also issued regulations that required mail carriers to offer pas­
senger service, expanded the frequency of passenger schedules and encouraged 
the carriers to acquire more and better equipment.18 Some of these service 
improvements were mandated in pursuit of objectives that were not purely, 
or in some cases not at all, postal. The carriers were, of course, paid for these 
service improvements by the Post Office Department. In the process mail 
u Watres Act, ch. 223, 46 Stat. 259. 
16 Id. 260. 
17 David 111-113, 119-123, 123-135. 
18 David 143. 
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compensation per ton·mlle rose from $5.14 in 1931 to $8.37 in 1933.19 The 
uniform system of 11ccounting adopted for mllil e11rriers m11de no attempt to 
segregate mllil costs from other costs. Less important than the particular 
rates or amounts pllid w11s the relationship the new payment system 11nd 
regulations established. The llirlines were expected to operate 11nd develop in 
11 way genernlly satisfactory to the n11tioniil, rather th11n piirticul11rly postal, 
interest. The Posi Oftke was to p11y the bills. Under this rel11tlonship, em· 
phitSis was placed on the need for 11ir service in general 11nd the needs of 
airlines in particular. The first generated pressures for llirmllil service on 
routes selected because they provided pitSsenger services to places well rep· 
resented in the polilical process. The second created expectations on the p11rt 
of the c11rriers th11t mllil rntes would reflect their generaliied "needs," r11ther 
th11n compensate them for services provided the Post Office. Both these 
emphitSes, but especlally the second, inlluenfe the internclion between the 
carriers and the Postal Service today. 
The manner in which contracts and cerlificates bad been awarded and 
routes arranged became the subject of national attention and a Senate inves­
tigation in 1934.2° Exposure of the conferences of 1930 (referred to in the 
Congress and press itS "the spoils conferences") and the Postm11Ster General's 
11Ssumption of authority in excess of that conferred upon him by the Watres 
Act led to the cancellation of existing contracts, a literally dis11Strous effort 
by the Army to fly the mail, and the passage of the Airmail Act of 1934.'1 
Authority to award airmail routes remained in the h11nds of the Post Office 
Department. Although no provision was made for formal certificates, the 
functional equivalent remllined. The Act provided for the award of new 
contracts by competitive bids, with indefinite extensions for the successful 
bidders after the one-year period of the initial contract. After performance of 
the initial contract at the bid rate, compensation was to be set by the In­
terstate Commerce Commission at "fair and reasonable" levels. 22 The prin­
cipal effect of this statute was to remove the setting of rates for the carriage 
of airmail from the Post Office Department to the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. The evolution of the Post Office Department from customer to 
instrument of subsidy WllS complete. The needs of the Post Office De­
partment no longer the paramount factor in determining which air services it 
would pay for. Furthermore, the Department could not determine the rates 
it would pay. 
An important effect of the Watres Act, Brown's subsequent actions, and 
u David 149. 
20 Senate Special Investigation on Air Mail and Ocean Mail Contracts, S. Rep. No. 254, 73rd 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1934). 
21 Air Mail Act of 1934, ch. 466, 48 Stat. 933. 
22 Id. 936.
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the consequences of the 1934 Act was to discredit competitive bidding for 
llirmllil contracts in the minds of the public and the Congress. Although the 
Watres Act called for competitive bidding, this arrangement was subverted 
by the Postmaster General, creating doubts that a competitive bidding sys· 
tern could operate without collusion. The result of the 1934 Act was to cast 
doubt upon bidding in the opposite way-the guarantee of compensatory 
rates for an indefinitely long period of time once the initial contract year had 
passed created incentives for airlines to "buy in" to the business and placed a 
premium on the ability to survive the initial period while operating below 
cost. The bids received were absurdly low-some were stilted in mills per 
mile-and were interpreted as evidence of "destructive competition" in the 
airline industry. Requests by the Postal Service for authority to contract 
competitively for airmail service have been made repeatedly since the late 
1960's.'3 The carriers and the Civil Aeronautics Board have used the 1930-
1935 experience as "evidence to engender and sustain the inconsistent fears 
that bidding would lead to collusion or excess competition." They have used 
these fears to persuade the Congress to reject the Postal Service requests. 
The fact that the previous Congressional attempts to use competitive con­
tracting were doomed to failure by lawlessness and incompetent institutional 
design, rather than by my defect in the concept itself, has somehow receded 
into the background. 
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 193824 was directed largely at the reduction 
or elimination of competition among airlines in providing passenger service, 
but it reduced further the Post Office Department's role as customer in 
determining the pattern of airmail services. The Post Office's power to con· 
tract for airmail service was completely extinguished and vested in the new 
regulatory agency (the Civil Aeronautics Authority, later the Civil Aeronau­
tics Board). The Act provided: 
a. That no one could carry mail by aircraft without a Civil Aeronautics
Board route certificate. Such certificates would be issued to those
carrying mail on existing contracts. 25 
b. That new routes would be assigned to carriers by the Board when 
required by the public convenience and necessity, and that in deter· 
mining whether such a certificate should be issued, the Board was to 
consider, among other things,26 "The encouragement and develop­
ment of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the present 
23 See text at 327 infra. 
24 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
25 Id. § 40I(a). 
"Id. § 40l(d). 
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and future needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United 
States, of the Postal Service, and of the national defense. "27 
c. Airlines were to file their schedules with the Postmaster General. He 
could then designate the flights on which the Post Office wished to 
transport mail. If the Post Office was dissatisfied with a schedule, the 
Postmaster G.eneral could order changes, refuse to allow changes 
proposed by the carriers, or even require new schedules to be added. 
However, if a carrier objected to the Post Office order, the Board was 
empowered to "amend, revise, suspend, or cancel" it. In other words, 
the Board had final authority to resolve schedule disputes between the 
carriers and the Post Office.28
d. That the Board had the authority to fix the rates paid to the carriers 
for the transportation of mail. 29 
e. Mail rates were to be set at a level that would satisfy the" . . .  need of 
such air carrier for compensation for the transportation of mail 
sufficient to insure the performance of such service, and, together with 
all other revenue of the air carrier, to enable such air carrier under
honest, economical, and efficient management, to maintain and con­
tinue the development of air transportation to the extent and of the
character required for the commerce of the United States, the Postal 
Service, and the national defense. " In other words, mail pay was to
continue to be the principal vehicle for direct subsidy of passenger 
and freight service. 30 
f. The Post Office was given priority on air service over other traffic up 
to a Board-established "maximum mail load. " The Board was also to 
determine the conditions under which mail in excess of the maximum
was to be carried. 31 
In a series of rate decisions in the early l 950's32 the Civil Aeronautics 
Board (CAB) determined that the domestic trunklines no longer needed a 
subsidy component in their mail rates. (Other classes of carrier, for example, 
local service and Alaskan carriers, continued to receive subsidies and, with 
the exception of Allegheny, are being subsidized at present. ) So-called 
"service mail rates" were established by the Board which were designed to 
2' Id. § 2(a). 
"Id. § 405(e). 
"Id. § 406(a). 
'°Id. § 406(b). 
"Id. § 405(0. 
32 For example, American Airlines, et al., Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B, 558 (1951). Capital Air­
lines, et al., Mail Rates, 18 C.A.B. 457, 467 (1954). 
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compensate the trunklines for rendering airmail service without reference to 
overall "need. " The Post Office continued to pay mail rates containing 
explicit subsidy to other classes of carriers and the Board still had authority 
to require Post Office subsidy payments to trunklines. In 1953, the Post 
Office was relieved of the obligation to make explicit subsidy payments to 
carriers. Thereafter, the Post Office paid only the service mail rate, while the 
Board paid out of direct appropriations any sums necessary to satisfy the 
"need" subsidy provision of§ 406(b). " Although the Federal Aviation Act of 
195834 mostly reenacted the economic regulation provisions of the Civil 
Aeronautics Act of 1938, the mail rate provisions" were rewritten to reflect 
this reorganization. 36 
One result of the separation of direct airline subsidy from mail rates was to 
make the subsidy more readily identifiable and to increase Congressional 
pressure to reduce it. Several of the Board's responses to this pressure af­
fected mail service. Subsidized service to low-traffic points was cut back in 
frequency and in many cases eliminated entirely through the so-called "use it 
or lose it " policy adopted by the Board in the Seven States case. 37 In addi­
tion, the transfer of some points from trunklines to local service carriers 
(done partly to produce internal subsidy) sometimes broke connections or 
changed the scheduling pattern so as to impair mail service. Other factors 
unrelated to subsidy were affecting airmail service. Cyclical variations in 
airline business conditions often led to flight cutbacks affecting mail ser­
vice on trunk.lines as well as local service carriers. And the introduction of 
larger equipment by local service carriers sometimes resulted in reduc­
tions in flight frequencies or revisions of schedules which reduced the quality 
of service from the standpoint of the Post Office Department. 
All these factors led the Post Office Department to seek authority 
from the CAB to contract for mail service when existing certificated service 
was unsatisfactory. 38 While the Board has always opposed postal contract­
ing on terms that would take business away from certificated carriers, it did 
33 Service Mail Rates, Reorganization Plan No. 10, 17 C.A.B. 898 (1953). 
34 Federal Aviation Act of 19581 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1962). 
35 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 6011 § 406, 52 Stat. 998. (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 486). 
Replaced by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1962). 
36 Federal Aviation Act of 19531 49 U.S.C. § 1376(c). 
37 The "use it or lose it" policy was established by the C.A.B. in the Seven States Area 
Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680 (1958): "Unless a city enplanes an average of at least five passen­
gers daily for the 12 months following the initial 6 months of service, we will . . .  institute a 
formal investigation to determine whether that city should lose its service . . , ." 28 C.A.B. 756 
(1958). 
38 The Postmaster General has always been reluctant to use his power to order carriers to put 
on additional schedules. In fact, the only such order ever issued was not issued until 1973, 
twenty-five years after the passage of the relevant statutory authority, See text at 350 itifra. 
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change its regulations" in 1965 to permit the Post Office Department to 
contract for mail carriage with air taxi operators. The Board had already 
exempted this class of operators from the certification requirements of the 
Act•• for the purpose of carrying passengers and freight, provided that they 
confined their operations to the use of relatively small aircraft.41 It extended 
this exemption to contract carriage of mail in aircraft of the same size as 
those usable in exempt passenger and freight service. The size restriction 
tended to keep costs fairly high (as it was designed to), but the attractions of 
late-night direct operation tailored to postal needs were sufficient to induce 
the Post Office Department to make extensive use of this authority. Such 
operations continue to the present day and have been expanded to include 
some rather high.-cost late-night service in small jet aircraft operated be­
tween large cities. 42 The economic effects of the Board's artificial restriction 
of contract service and the Postal Service's use of air taxis will be discussed 
in Section II. 
In 1 969, growing public, governmental and Congressional dissatisfaction 
with postal organization and performance led to proposals for a sweeping 
reorganization of the Post Office. Many of the provisions of the original 
postal reform bills43 were intended to reduce the governmental, or "social" 
role of the Post Office Department by removing many restrictions which 
prevented the Department from moving mail at the lowest possible cost in 
an effort to subsidize or favor certain classes of users or suppliers. Among 
these were a major revision of the relationship between the Department, air 
carriers, and the CAB H.R. 4 gave the new Postal Service the option of 
contracting with any certificated air carrier for service on its certificated 
routes at rates higher or lower than those prescribed by the CAB. 44 H. R. 
1 1750 included as well provisions allowing contracts with any air carrier45 
for service between points where there was no certificated. carrier or where 
the Postal Service determined that the service being provided by the cer­
tificated carriers was "not adequate for its purposes." The Board could 
39 Economic Regulation 4451 14 C.F.R. § 298.2l(f) (1965). 
4° Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 401 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 481) replaced by 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1371 (1962). 
41 Until 1960, such operations were limited to aircraft with a maximum gross takeoff weight 
of 12,500 lbs. Economic Regulation 317, 14 C.F.R. § 298.11 (1961). These restrictions were 
liberalized for turbojet operations in 1968. Economic Regulation 548, 14 C.F.R. §§ 298.3, 
298.21 (1969). Economic Regulation 549, 14 C.F .R. § 298.3, 298.21 (1969). The present limit is 
that the aircraft be designed to carry no more than 30 pass'engers or 7 ,500 lbs. of payload. 14 
C.F.R. § 298 (1974). 
42 United States Postal Service, Memo to: Mailers, 1, 7, 8 (1972). 
43 H.R. 4, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). H.R. 11750, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
44 H.R. 4, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. § 303 (1969) (adding§ 630l(a) to 39 U.S.C.). 
45 Not just those certified by the Board to carry mail. 
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disapprove the latter contracts within 90 days, but the contracts were 
exempt from the certification and mail rate provisions of the Federal Avia­
tion Act.•• These provisions, especially those of H.R. 1 1 750, would have 
restored competitive conditions in the supply of most airmail transportation, 
and were strenuously resisted by the trunklines and the Board. 
This contracting authority paralleled in substance arrangements which 
had long been in existence with respect to postal purchases of railroad trans­
portation. 47 The Postal Service was in effect to be given the option of procur­
ing required service at Board-prescribed rates or voluntarily-negotiated ser­
vice at contract rates. Where this option was available to the Postal Service 
in surface transportation, virtually no traffic moved at Interstate Commerce 
Commission rates. The Board and the carriers correctly identified these 
provisions as a threat to their existing arrangement. 48 They and their 
supporters did not oppose the authority on the grounds that the Postal 
Service needed the protection of an agency designed to protect the traveling 
and shipping public. Rather, they argued that without the protection of the 
Board, rates for airmail transportation would be too low, that the public 
interest required that the Board protect the carriers from their powerful 
customer.49 The Post Office Department strongly supported the measure on 
the grounds that the Board was preventing the Department from purchasing 
transportation at the lowest possible rates and inhibiting the custom­
tailoring of air service to postal needs by stifling alternatives to the service 
provided by the scheduled carriers.'0 
Postal reform in general was sufficiently controversial that Congressional 
deliberations extended into the second session of the Ninety-First Congress. 
By the spring of 1970, factors having nothing to do with transportation (a 
threatened postal strike, among other things) increased pressure to pass a 
bill. The Administration produced a new Bill (incorporating much of H.R. 
4), introduced into the House as H.R. 1 7070. The Senate, which had previ­
ously held hearings on H.R.4 and H.R. 1 1750, produced its own Bill (S. 
3613), which differed significantly from the Administration Bill. The airmail 
provisions of the two bills differed radically. H.R. 1 7070, as introduced, 
expanded even the liberal airmail contracting authority of H.R. 1 1750. It 
46 H.R. 11750, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1653(a), 1653(b), 1653(c) (1969). 
47 Act of July 28, 1916, ch. 261, § 5, 39 Stat. 412, 427. 
48 The Postmaster General was somewhat disingenuous in claiming that the contracting 
provisions would not affect most mail carried by air. Postal Modernization hearings before the 
S. Comm on Post Office & Civil Service, 91st Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 385 (1969-70) 
[hereinafter cited as Postal Modernization]. 
49 In the course of doing so, they cited the "disastrous" experience with contracting in the 
l 930's as evidence for the unworkability of direct airmail contracting, Id. 425 (Testimony of 
Stuart G. Tipton, Pres., Air Transport Ass'n). 
so Id. 391, 392 (Testimony of P. G. Winston Blount). 
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provided for contracting authority with any certificated air carrier (including 
supplementals) over the routes or within the area in which they were cer­
tificated and by its terms extended authority to all such carriers to carry mail. 
(The supplementals were and are not certificated by the CAB to carry mail. ) 
Rates were to be no higher than those prescribed by the Board for priority mail 
and no higher than Board-authorized airfreight rates for mail carried on a 
space-available basis. 51 Other contracting provisions remained the same as in 
H.R. 11750. 
The Senate Bill was much more confining. It provided for contracting 
only with scheduled airlines over routes for which they were certificated or 
with air taxis, unless there was no service certificated between the points 
involved. Contracts with scheduled carriers had to involve a minimum of 
5000 pounds per flight, no more than 5 per cent of which could be letter 
mail. 52 Since the Post Office Department was mainly interested in carrying 
high-value letter mail by air at lower rates than those prescribed by the 
CAB, these restrictions rendered the proposed authority unattractive. From 
the airline point of view, they made good sense. The carriers could continue 
to carry letter mail at the Board-prescribed rates, unless it was accompanied 
by enough new business in the form of mail that was not then moving by air 
to make up for any lost revenue resulting from the carriage of letter mail at 
the lower rates that would result from contracting. The Post Office Depart­
ment had already obtained authority to contract with air taxis by CAB 
regulations," so the Senate Bill gave the Department nothing new in that 
respect. In any event, the aircraft size limitations imposed by the CAB on 
exempt carriers prevented, as they were designed to, air taxis from provid­
ing effective competition for the scheduled airlines except in special cir­
cumstances. The Senate Bill was reported out and passed as S. 3842 with the 
contracting provisions only slightly liberalized. The final version of the Sen­
ate Bill had a contract minimum of 1000 pounds per flight, up to 1 0  per 
cent of which would be letter mail. 54 
H.R. 17070 was reported out to the House floor with only one change in 
the contracting provisions. In response to CAB and airline criticism, the 
provision allowing contracts with certificated carriers (§853(a)) was changed 
to allow the CAB to disapprove such contracts during a 90-day period 
between the time of filing and the effective date. This provision paralleled 
the requirement as to contracts where the Postmaster General found existing 
51 H.R. 17070 (as introduced April 16, 1970) §§ 853(a), (b), (c), 9lstCong., 2nd Sess. (1970). 
52 The other 95% would be made up of magazines and other "time-value" second class mail, 
parcels, and anything else the Postal Service decided to ship by air. S. 3613 (as introduced 
March 19, 19701 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., § 5502(a) (1970). 
53 See supra at 327 
.· 
54 S. 3842, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., § SSOJ(a}. 
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scheduled service to be inadequate (§853(c) ) .  The requirement did little to 
mollify the airlines and the CAB, since the 90-day period was considered to 
be too short to allow the Board to act. 
In the debate before the full House, the contracting provisions of the 
House Bill ran into very heavy fire. Harley 0. Staggers, Chairman of the 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, strongly objected to Postal 
Service contracting on both substantive and jurisdictional grounds. The 
substantive grounds were a rehash of the basic arguments against competi­
tion in the supply of airline services. Mr. Staggers cited the collusion that 
had occurred under Postmaster General Brown and claimed that contracts 
posed a threat to airline safety. 55 The ranking minority member of the 
committee raised the equally dreaded, if inconsistent, prospect of cutthroat 
competition. 56 These arguments, of course, had been raised during commit­
tee hearings and it is difficult to know whether they would have been 
sufficient to overcome the House's normal reluctance to amend the work of a 
committee which has held hearings on and written a bill. They were com­
bined, however, with the argument that the relationship of the Postal Ser­
vice, the CAB, and the carriers properly belonged within the jurisdiction of 
his Commerce Committee, which ordinarily handled transportation regula­
tory matters, and that the Post Office Committee had usurped this jurisdic­
tion by including the contract provisions. 57 This argument evoked a sym­
pathetic response from members of other committees, such as Public 
Works" who felt that their own jurisdictional prerogatives had been slight­
ed in the preparation of other portions of the legislation. Despite a vigorous 
defense by the Chairman and other members of the Post Office committee," 
and Mr. Conte's attempt to cast the committee bill as a compromise by 
proposing even more liberal contracting authority, •0 the House approved 
Mr. Staggers' amendment deleting all contracting authorization from the 
Bill. 61 
This turn of events provides an interesting illustration of the processes 
that produce and maintain government regulation at public expense. The 
airlines had experienced relatively little difficulty in establishing government 
protection during the period when the Post Office Department was in­
terested in pursuing an active role in shaping their development. As mail 
played a diminishing role in airline operations (a process materially aided, as 
55 116 Cong. Rec. 20,458 Gune 18, 1970) (remarks of Rep. Staggers). 
56 Id. at 20461 (remarks of Rep. Springer). 
57 Jd. at 20462. 
58 Jd. at 20459 (remarks of Rep. Gray). 
Sil Jd. at 20459·60, 20469. 
60 Id. at 20459 (proposal of Rep. Conte), 
61 Jd. at 20469. 
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we have seen, by Post Office Department actions and subsidy), the airlines 
were able to extend the pattern established in their dealings with postal 
authorities to the passenger-carrying aspect of their business. This was ac­
complished without opposition from. the Post Office, which must have seen 
the cartelization of passenger operations as a development which would 
reduce postal support of airlines over the Jong run. As the Post Office came 
under pressure to improve the efficiency of its own operations, airmail 
transportation rates established by a body whose mission was to protect 
airline revenues presented an obvious opportunity to economize. But by that 
time, airline regulation had acquired its own patrons and its own institu· 
tions. The congressional forces which had extended the techniques of airline 
carteliiation pioneered by the Post Office Dep11rtment were now in­
stitutionalized in the Commerce Committee, a body much more powerful 
than the Post Office Committee. The Post Office Committee was concerned 
principally with postal needs and felt no institutional obligation toward the 
airlines or the CAB. As Jong as the contract provisions remained within its 
jurisdiction, postal economy would be the dominating factor in determining 
their content. But the Commerce Committee existed as an advocate for 
airline and CAB interests, for whom postal economy was desirable only if it 
could be achieved at no cost to the carriers. This committee naturally op­
posed contracting authority for the Postal Service. 
Although Mr. Dulski, the chairman of the Post Office Committee, rightly 
pointed out during the debate that a bill as complicated as the Postal Reor­
ganization Act necessarily cut across jurisdictional lines, we can speculate 
that his failure to consult the Commerce Committee on the airmail contract­
ing provisions was not entirely accidental. Whether his committee would 
have been better off by consulting the Commerce Committee and ignoring 
their advice or by taking the course the chairman took is immaterial. As long 
as the interests of the airlines and the CAB were well represented in the 
Commerce Committee, no way could be found to reintroduce competition 
into even so small a part of the modern airline industry as mail carriage 
without creating a jurisdictional battle. And the existence of the jurisdic­
tional dispute made it possible for the chairman of the Commerce Commit­
tee to form a coalition on the House floor between those who favored 
eliminating the contract provisions and those who were interested in pre­
serving the jurisdictional prerogatives of their own committees on future 
matters that might affect them. Congressional committee organization 
played a major role in denying the new Postal Service airmail contracting 
rights. 
Jurisdictional matters seem also to have played a role in the Senate. The 
Senate Post Office Committee bills were quite restrictive on the contracting 
issue from their beginnings in the first draft of S. 3613. This may seem 
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inconsistent with the explanation offered for the posture of the Post Office 
Committee in the House, but on closer examination, a reconciliation is 
possible. The Senate is a smaller body than the House, and Senators sit on 
more committees and have more interaction with each other in the commit­
tee context than do Representatives. Senator McGee, for example, was a 
member of the Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees as well as 
the Post Office Committee." In addition, the chairman of the Senate Com­
merce Committee (Senator Magnuson) was and is a very powerful figure in 
the Senate. The combination of McGee's relatively diluted (compared to 
Congressman Dulski's) interest in postal matters and his undoubted aware­
ness of the Commerce Committee's interest in CAB matters is illustrated by 
the great deference shown that committee in the Post Office Committee 
report to the Senate. That report advised the Post Office Department that 
any problems with CAB rates or procedures or requests for authority to deal 
with any carriers not presently certificated to carry mail should be taken up 
with the Commerce Committee. 63 
The jurisdictional matter was resolved in the Senate before the bill was 
drafted. Any inclination McGee may have had to contest the matter was 
undoubtedly further diluted by his apparent conviction that airmail con­
tracting would save the Postal Service relatively little in proportion to its 
total budget while possibly having a considerable profit impact on financially 
insecure airlines,64 who could be relied on to make their concerns known to 
the CAB and the Commerce Committee. The issue must have seemed to 
McGee one with a high risk and a low payoff. Even the inclination of the 
bill's coauthor, Senator Fong, toward more liberalized contracting author­
ity65 was apparently insufficient to force a confrontation with the Commerce 
Committee. An additional factor may have been the presence on the Post 
Office Committee of Senator Randolph, chairman of the powerful Public 
Works Committee, whose views on this issue were very strongly pro-airline. 
Without the prospect of a losing fight against powerful airline support, it is 
difficult to understand Senator McGee's curiously negative posture toward 
money-saving aspects of the Postal Service's desire to save money in procur­
ing airmail service. 66 
The final outcome of the controversy over contracting provisions of the 
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 was determined in a House-Senate Con­
ference on the conflicting bills. The House conferees were Jed by Mr. Dulski, 
whose enthusiasm for the Staggers amendment was predictably scant. The 
62 1970 Congressional Directory 178 (1970). 
63 Postal Reorganization, Senate Rep. No. 91-912, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 2 1  (1970). 
64 See Postal Modernization, 393-395, 398-400. 
65 1 1 6  Cong. Rec. 21717 Gune 26, 1970) (remarks of Senator Fong). 
66 Postal Reorganization, Senate Rep. No. 91-912, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., 17�18 (1970). 
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presence of the Senate contracting provisions, limited as they were, afforded 
an opportunity to include at least some expansion of postal airmail contract­
ing authority in the final bill. The slightly unusual result of the conference 
was a contracting provision67 which followed the form of the Senate bill, but 
relaxed the weight restriction slightly. 68 It thus provided more liberal con­
tracting authority than either of the bills supposedly being reconciled. Mr. 
Staggers was not 'pleased by Mr. Dulski's efforts on behalf of the House 
version of the bill and said so at some length on the floor of the House, 69 but 
both houses of Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act in the form 
approved by the conferees. 
Aside from issues related to contracting for airmail services, the only 
airmail transportation regulatory issue affected by the Postal Reorganization 
Act was that of distribution of mail business among competing air carriers. 
Since Board-established mail rates are higher than those for freight with 
similar characteristics and since most airmail is carried in space produced as 
a by-product of the production of passenger service, airmail is highly profit­
able to the carriers on an incremental basis. Carriers regard themselves as 
entitled to a "fair share" of this bounty, partially for reasons related to the 
history of mail pay set out above. The Postal Service has historically attempt­
ed to divide mail more or less equally between carriers offering approxi­
mately similar services, but has also historically taken the position that it is 
not obligated to do so. This issue will be discussed in more detail in Section 
II below, but the development of the Postal Reorganization Act's treatment 
of the problem is worth noting briefly. 
H.R.4 and H.R. 1 1 750, the original postal reform bills, made no reference 
to the distribution of mail between competing carriers. Indeed H.R. 4's 
introductory section 70 emphasized the need for flexibility in Postal Service 
authority to procure mail transportation. By the spring of 1970, both the 
House (Administration) and Senate bills contained language whose meaning 
is still disputed, but which has been interpreted by airlines to establish a 
policy favoring equal distribution of mail business among competing 
schedules. 71 The language in question, as finally enacted, 72 states that: 
In selecting modes of transportation, the Postal Service shall give highest considera­
tion to the prompt and economical delivery of all mail and shall make a fair and 
67 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 5402 (1973). 
68 S. 3842, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., § 5503(a). 
6!i 116 Cong. Rec. 27600 (Aug. 6, 1970). 
70 H.R. 4, 9lst Cong., 1st SeSs., § 101(3) (1969). 
71 Previously, this matter had been covered by internal postal regulations. U.S. Postal Ser� 
vice, Methods Handbook, Series M�31-Air Service Instructions, § 142 Division of Mail. 
12 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § lOl(f) (1973). 
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equitable distribution of mail business to carriers providing similar modes of trans­
portation services to the Postal Service. 
When this provision first appeared in early drafts of S. 361373 its language 
was considerably more vague with respect to obligations toward competing 
carriers, and it became more specific as the bill went through the hearing 
and drafting process. 74 It appeared in the House bill substantially as 
enacted. 75 The Postal Service resisted this language and the airlines favored 
it. The denouement parallels the outcome of the battle over contracting 
authority. This dispute apparently took place largely behind the scenes and 
little if any reference to the language involved appears in the floor debates or 
the hearing record. 
In summary, the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 made few changes in 
the relationship between the Postal Service on one hand and the airlines and 
the CAB on the other. The Post Office Department failed in its attempt to 
get substantially increased authority to contract with the airlines individu­
ally and directly, rather than dealing with them collectively through the 
CAB. Notwithstanding the general rhetoric stating the intention of Congress 
to allow the Postmaster General more flexibility in running the Postal Ser­
vice efficiently and economically, Congress may have reduced the Postal 
Service's ability even to select the airline schedules on which it would dis­
patch mail. The Act did provide emergency contracting authority,76 air taxi 
contracting authority,77 contracting authority for mail service between 
points not served by a certificated carrier, 78 and a very limited form of 
contracting with scheduled airlines. 79 But the first two basically reenacted 
authority already available to the Postal Service by statute•• or regulation. 81 
The third was of only interstitial value. And the last provided authority of 
almost no value to the Postal Service. 
As of 1975, the arrangements which regulate the interaction between the 
Postal Service and the airlines differ in no important economic respects from 
the arrangements established by the Airmail Act of 1934. There are a few 
differences: the Postal Service no longer provides explicit subsidy to the 
carriers, the governmental agency which protects the carriers from each 
73 S. 3613, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., § lOl(e) (1970) (first draft). 
74 S. 3613, 9lst Cong., 2nd Sess., § lOl(e) (1970) (14th committee print). 
"H.R. 17070, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., § lOl(e) (1970). 
76 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 5001 (1973). 
11 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 5402(c) (1973). 
78 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U . S.C. § 5402(b) (1973). 
7!i Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § S402(a) (1973). 
80 39 U.S.C. I 6302 (1958) (Supp. Ill). 
" 14 C.F.R. § 298.21(!) (1965). 
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other and from the public is the Civil Aeronautics Board rather than the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, and securing the right to carry mail does 
not require deliberately taking a two-year operating loss as a prelude to a 
comfortable and profitable relationship. But even the replacement of Post 
Office requests for bids by route certificates now has little practical conse­
quence, since by 1934 tpe Post Office selected many routes for other than postal 
reasons, and since the Postal Service can now award contracts for services 
not provided by certificated route carriers. Perhaps the only change of any 
significance is the ability to contract with air taxi operators and interstitial 
operators at rates not set by an outside agency. Most of the problems and 
controversies that prompted the Post Office Department to seek reform in 
the Postal Reorganization Act remain unresolved and continue to affect the 
prices and conditions on which the Postal Service purchases air transporta· 
tion. These will be examined in the next section. 
II 
The principal contemporary issues in regulating airmail transportation are 
a product of the interaction of the regulatory history set out in Part I and the 
economic characteristics of airmail operations. Only about 6.3 per cent82 of 
the mail carried by air moves in aircraft exclusively devoted83 to mail. Most 
is carried in aircraft which carry passengers and freight as well as mail, and 
the remainder is carried in aircraft which carry freight as well as mail. Most 
flights on which airmail moves are scheduled for the convenience of other· 
than-mail traffic and would be operated even if there was no expectation on 
the part of the carrier that mail would be tendered. For only a few non­
contract flights (generally late at night, when the aircraft would otherwise be 
idle) do prospective mail revenues play a major role in the carriers' schedul­
ing decisions. Thus most mail is carried in capacity created as a by-product 
of servicing other traffic. 
Several technical characteristics of modern transport aircraft account for 
the by-product character of most airmail capacity. Under most conditions, 
airline aircraft can lift more passengers by weight than can be accommo­
dated at acceptable levels of comfort and evacuation safety. 84 This is par-
82 Derived from Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, hear­
ings before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 93rd Cong . ,  2nd Sess. ,  pt. 2,  
at 168,  and Air Carrier Traffic Statistics Dec. 1974, at 4 (Civil Aeronautics Bd.). Virtually all 
mail-only movement is provided under contract by air taxi operators. Therefore, this propor­
tion has been derived by subtracting the ton-miles moved by certified domestic air carriers in 
1973 from the total Postal Service intercity air transportation workload, comparing the re­
mainder to the total. 
83 "Dedicated," in Postal Service terminology. 
84 This is not true for an aircraft operated from runways appreciably shorter, or from airfields 
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ticularly true of modern jet aircraft, but is generally true for most aircraft 
being flown at less than maximum designed range. In addition, historically 
high fares (a by-product of r�gulation") have meant that airliners fly at 
relatively low load factors,86 thus freeing still more weight lifting ability. 
Pressurized aircraft are designed with roughly circular fuselage cross­
seetions. The passenger deck floor is then placed just below the widest point 
so as to maximize passenger compartment width at seat level. For all but the 
smallest aircraft used by certificated carriers, the fuselage cross-section 
leaves more space available below the passenger deck than is necessary to 
accommodate baggage and aircraft systems. 81 Thus, a by-product of mod· 
ern passenger air transportation is the creation of additional space that 
moves with the passenger compartment at no added cost. Loads using this 
11pace can be flown for only the cost of handling plus a slight additional fuel 
cost. This space is rather odd-shaped and, for all but the largest aircraft, 
relatively small compared to the remaining weight lifting capacity with a 
typical passenger load over a typical stage length. It can be used most 
efficiently if the load is flexible in shape and high in density. Mail and certain 
freight items fit this description exactly. 
Although passenger and cargo flights are not always ideally timed for 
postal purposes, by-product mail service on these flights is always the lowest 
cost way to move mail by air. Nevertheless , where available by-product 
service is very inconvenient or nonexistent, the Postal Service often finds 
that meeting service standards requires the use of contract air taxi service in 
dedicated aircraft. Since by-product service is provided at rates which are 
often considerably above incremental cost, fairly large quantities of mail can 
occasionally be moved in contract aircraft meeting the limitations of Part 
29888 at costs to the Postal Service only somewhat higher than by-product 
service. In most cases, however, contract service costs the Postal Service 
much more than by-product service. And the difference in resource cost is 
even greater than comparison of Postal Service costs would suggest. 89 
Most mail carriage in combination aircraft is very inexpensive for the 
with density altitudes appreciably higher, or over ranges significantly longer, than those for 
which the designs were optimized, but these are unusual circumstances. 
85 Theodore E. Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance, 3 Bell J. Econ. & 
Manag. Sci. 399, tab. 8, at 420 (1972). Comment, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air 
Transportation and Regulatory Policy, 74 Yale L.]. 1416 (1965) [by Michael E. Levine]. 
86 G. Douglas & J Miller III, Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport 145 (Brook­
ings Inst., Studies in Reg. of Econ. Activity, 1974). 
87 For dimensions and capacities of modem transport aircraft, see 106 Flight International 
551-559 (Oct. 24, 1974). 
8a See supra at 15-16.
8 9  Data derived from Postal Oversight, hearings before the S. Comm. on Post Office & Civil 
Service, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 139, 143, 144, 148-165 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Postal 
Oversight]. 
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carriers to provide and very expensive for the Postal Service to replace. On a 
few flights, more mail and freight may be tendered than can be accommo­
dated, and freight may be left behind to accommodate mail. Very occasion­
ally, a flight may be so heavily loaded with passenger baggage that even mail 
will be refused.•• But given the relatively low load factors at which most 
certificated service operates, mail and freight rarely compete for space and, 
given the cost of service in dedicated aircraft, the Postal Service must only 
very rarely find that it can procure contract service at overall costs competi­
tive with using the certificated carriers. As we have seen in Part I, the 
carriers have been very effective in their political efforts to prevent the 
narrowing of this spread by making less expensive alternatives available 
(through contract) to the Postal Service. Even those efforts would not pre­
vent the Postal Service from reaping the benefits of the low-cost by-product 
space if the carriers were in rate competition with one another. But rate 
competition was eliminated , first by the Post Office Department and later by 
regulatory legislation, and the result is rates set by a form of negotiation 
between the carriers and the Postal Service, with the CAB serving as both 
cartel organizer for the carriers and final arbiter. 
The CAB's solicitude for the financial health of the carriers has led it to set 
minimum rates for airmail carriage which greatly exceed the incremental 
costs incurred by the carriers providing the service. Although much freight 
(which is rarely cheaper and often more expensive to carry than mail) has 
moved at rates designed to cover incremental costs and make a relatively 
small contribution to overheads,91 rates for priority mail carriage have been 
set on a fully-allocated cost basis. 92 Freight rates have reflected the costs of 
available by-product capacity which would otherwise go unused," as well 
90 Until October 13, 1913, mail was divided into "priority mail" and "space-available" mail. 
"Space-available" mail was first-class mail carried by air at a lower rate than airmail, if space 
was left after airmail was loaded. In the Postal Service's opinion, "space-available" mail was 
left behind too often, so a temporary all-priority rate was negotiated, Since then all letter mail 
has travelled on a "committed space" (that is, j'priority") basis at a rate (25.01 cents/ton-mile) 
lower than the airmail rate (29.8 cent.s/ton-mile), but considerably higher than the "space­
available" rate (16.9 cents/ton-mile). Postal Oversight pt. 5, at 145. An indication of how 
infrequently capacity limitations require choosing between mail and other traffic is the fact that 
during the period March I ,  1973-August 31, 1973 (under the two-class system), priority mail 
was not fully accommodated on only 627 (.03%) of the approximately 1,932,999 airline flights to 
which it was tendered, and space-available mail was not fully accommodated on only 10, 122 
(.5%) of the flights to which mail was tendered. (Data derived by calculation from Postal 
Oversight pt. 5,  147, 150.) Thus,
' 
baggage almost never precluded carrying other forms of 
traffic, and only rarely (.5% of the time) did mail fill all available space remaining. 
91 Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation, Docket No. 22859, at 1 5  (April 15, 1975). Ameri­
can Air. , et al., Mail Rates, 14 CAB 571 (1951). Minimum Rates Applicable to Airfreight, 34 
CAB 263, 266 (1961). 
92 For example, American Air., et al., Mail Rates, 14 CAB 571 (1951). 
93 Jd. 
REGULATING AIRMAIL TRANSPORTATION 337 
as the fact that for most shippers, there are relatively good substitutes for 
airfreight. Mail rates have reflected the lower quality of the substitutes for 
airline carriage of mail and the ability of the Board to shield the carriers 
from intraindustry competition. 94 The spread between rates and costs has 
provided a major incentive for supplemental carriers to seek authority to 
carry mail, either on a "fill-up" or dedicated vehicle basis. 9:is By the same 
token, the profitability of mail carried at CAB rates explains the vehemence 
of scheduled airline objections to expanded procurement authority for the 
Postal Service to mail carriage by other classes of carriers.96 It also accounts 
for the controversies that have arisen over the distribution of business ("divi­
sion of mails") among scheduled carriers operating over the same routes. 97 
CAB-established rates for loose-sack (non-containerized) mail are uni­
form98 for all quantities tendered and do not reflect airline savings in han­
dling costs that arise from consolidating mail into relatively few dispatches 
and savings in carriage cost arising from the use of large-capacity aircraft. 
(Neither do these uniform rates reflect the higher unit costs of handling very 
small dispatches, but these make up a very small proportion of the total mail 
shipped.) Coupled with the high spread between CAB rates and incremental 
cost, this rate uniformity has affected Postal Service choices in choosing 
between certificated and air taxi service to carry mail. Since the Postal 
Service is not permitted to reap full benefits from the economies of large­
aircraft transportation of consolidated dispatches of mail, it faces distorted 
incentives in choosing between price and convenience in shipping mail by 
air. Moderately large shipments of mail can be consolidated for carriage in 
smaller, less efficient aircraft operated by air taxi operators on schedules 
"custom tailored" for the Postal Service at rates only slightly higher than the 
uniform rates. If the CAB rate for such shipments reflected either their 
economies relative to smaller shipments or the low incremental costs to the 
certificated carriers of carrying mail, or both, the spread between air taxi 
service rates and combination aircraft service rates would be very wide, and 
the Postal Service could be expected to use air taxi service less often. As it is, 
the relatively small difference between the uniform rates and the costs of the 
air taxi operators makes the convenience of custom scheduling very attrac­
tive. 
94 The Board appears to be in the process of enforcing wider use of fully-allocated costing in 
setting airfreight rates. Domestic Air Freight Rate Investigation, Docket No. 22859, at 17 (April 
15, 1975). 
9S Postal Modernization 433. 
96 Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 107, 243. 
97 Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 2 13�214, 184, 239-242. 
98 Postal Modernization 4 16. See, for example, Capital Air., et al., Mail Rates, 18 C.A.B.
457, 467 (1954); Domestic Service Mail Rate Investigation, 47 CAB 310, .357 (1967). 
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These rate characteristics have also exacetbated disputes between the 
Postal Service and the certificated carriers regarding the relationship be­
tween price and quality of service. The Postal Service has attempted to create 
competition (principally schedule, facility, and capacity competition) among 
carriers wishing to carry mail at CAB rates. The Postal Service has taken the 
position that it should either get better service from the airlines at the rates it 
pays, or be allowed to pay lower rates. And the Postal Service has been 
forced by the general rate structure to adopt somewhat irregular variations" 
on CAB procedures in order to get rates that reflect the economies of con­
tainerization. 
Disputes between the carriers and the Postal Service, then, result from the 
fact that neither the CAB rate structure nor the transportation patterns it 
has fostered have reflected the basic economics of airmail carriage. These 
disparities, in turn, are the product of a regulatory pattern which reflects a 
complicated fifty-year historical relationship between the carriers and the 
Post Office Department. The impact of these factors can be examined more 
specifically by considering in detail the basic airmail issues unsatisfactorily 
resolved by the Postal Reorganization Act and some of the related disputes 
that have arisen since then. These problem areas include defining the au­
thority of the Postal Service to contract for mail service and rates, determin­
ing the types of carriers who can carry mail, deciding what classes of mail 
should be carried by air, with what priority and at what rates, reconciling 
divergencies between the schedules of the certificated carriers and the re­
quirements of the Postal Service, and dividing business among competing 
carriers. 
One of the most dramatic illustrations of the influence of the CAB rate 
structure on relationships between the carriers and the Postal Service can be 
found in the longstanding dispute over the right of the Postal Service to 
contract for the carriage of mail by air. As we have seen, 100 the Postal 
Service energetically but fruitlessly sought essentially unlimited contract 
authority while the Postal Reorganization Act was making its way through 
the Congress. Postal Service attempts to expand its freedom to contract with 
certificated scheduled carriers were frustrated by the 750 lb/JO per cent 
letter-mail restriction, and its efforts to acquire the right to purchase services 
from alternative carriers such as supplementals were even less successful. 
Since the Postal Service was permitted by CAB exemption to contract with 
air taxi operators before the Postal Reorganization Act was passed, the 
legislative confirmation of this practice did not represent an expansion of 
procurement choices. Indeed, the only reason the Board and the Congress 
99 Postal Oversight, pt. 2 ,  at 268w27J1 291 . 
wo Supra at J27.J2.
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permitted contracting with air taxis was that the equipment limitations 
elsewhere imposed on those operators were such that they could not provide 
the Postal Service with a cost-effective alternative for most mail service. The 
Postal Service continued to request greatly expanded contracting authority 
after the Postal Reorganization Act was passed, again pressing its case in the 
Postal Oversight Hearings of 1 973. 101 The carriers strenuously resisted the 
expansion of contracting authority in 1969 and 1970, 102 and again in
1973. 103 The persistence of the Postal Service's �fforts and the determination 
with which the carriers resisted are a product of the rate structure and 
regulatory patterns imposed by the CAB on the carriage of mail by air. 
In brief, what the Postal Service hoped to gain from contracting with the 
scheduled certificated carriers were some service improvements, lower rates 
on high-volume shipments, and the benefits of service and perhaps even rate 
competition among carriers desiring postal contracts. While the airlines did 
not object in principle to schedule improvements, high-volume service inno­
vations, or even some lower rates, they objected strenuously to the introduc­
tion of competition, correctly perceiving that competition would eliminate the 
possibility of controlling rate and service innovation so as to raise profits. 
The carriers realized that rate and service innovations would leave the 
Postal Service with an alternative to the high-rate loose-sack shipments that 
they were carrying so profitably. One might expect that saving public money 
by eliminating cartel rents being taken by air carriers from the Postal Service 
would appeal to a deficit-sensitive Congress and that carriers would find it 
difficult sucessfully to oppose proposals claimed to have this result. But the 
politics of postal reform in genera! , and airline regulation in particular, have 
a logic of their own. By this logic, the "need" of the air carriers for their 
monopoly profits on mail carriage meant that lowering the cost of airmail 
carriage was seen as an unacceptable method of reducing postal deficits . 1 04 
The Postal Service reflected its understanding of the underlying political 
reality by presenting contracting proposals as principally directed at achiev­
ing service improvements, with cost savings coming as an almost regretta­
ble, but inevitable, by-product. 105 
The political history of the contracting issue makes generalizations about 
the "real" motives of the Postal Service (as of the scheduled airlines) danger­
ous, but a reasonably plausible synthesis can be attempted. To put the 
proposition in its most general form, the Postal Service has argued re-
101 Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 142·143.
102 Supra at 321w28. 
103 Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 107, 243. 
104 Supra at 331·32. 
10s Postal Modernization 3901 391.
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peatedly that it wished to deal with air carriers on a customer-supplier1 06 
basis, with the Postal Service determining what services it wants and is 
willing to pay for and purchasing from competing vendors. It wishes to free 
itself from playing an externally-determined (by the CAB) role in a rate 
package designed to accommodate passenger and freight traffic. The free­
dom offered by contract would be procedural as well as substantive.  At 
present, the rates that
' 
certificated scheduled carriers receive for carrying mail 
are set in "service mail rate" cases. These cases usually involve the rate for 
the current and recently past period. They take several years to decide, 
during which neither the Postal Service nor the airlines know what rate is to 
be paid for current or future transportation of mail. They only know the rate 
for the last "closed" period (which may have ended several years ago), so all 
mail carried at service mail rates is accompanied by "progress payments" 
based on the old rate, subject to a retroactive adjustment at the end of the 
period. 1 07 The Postal Service believes that carriage of mail at firm contract 
rates determined in advance would allow better planning by both the Postal 
Service and the airlines and greatly reduce the uncertainty costs imposed by 
the present system. 108 That the airlines are willing to carry mail without 
knowing how much they will, in the end, be paid for their efforts is one of 
the strongest pieces of evidence available to suggest that the CAB's role in 
setting mail rates is strongly protective of the carriers. Obviously, the car­
riers trust the Board to ensure that they are amply rewarded in the end with 
CAB rates higher than those which they could negotiate on their own by an 
amount sufficiently greater to make the uncertainty worth bearing. 
Free to deal with the airlines as a buyer of services, the Postal Service 
evidently believes that it could move mail on existing flights at lower rates 
than those set by the Board and be in a position to use consolidation of 
business or higher rates to encourage services timed for the convenience of 
the mail. The uniform high rate set by the Board is neither low enough to 
reflect the incremental costs of mail carriage on flights scheduled to attract 
passengers and freight, nor flexible enough to reflect the costs of any particu­
lar operation tailored to the needs of the Postal Service. The Postal Service 
also implies109 that only contract rates will allow it the flexibility to make full 
use of containerization, which typically involves a mix of space, equipment, 
and services by both carrier and post office very different from the dispatch 
of loose-sack mail. Certainly, the Postal Service would not make full use of 
containerization at loose-sack rates, since the only savings which it could 
1°6 For example,  Postal Modernization 393-403. 
107 Postal Oversight, pt. 5 ,  at 4.
ioa Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 142.
109 Postal Modernization 391.
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achieve would be internal costs of handling, but there is no reason in princi­
ple why Board rates could not be set for containerized mail and, indeed, 
something like that has occurred in the daylight container program, which is 
discussed infra. 
The Postal Service has also claimed1 1 0  that it could increase the propor­
tion of mail that moves by air if it were free to contract at rates related to the 
costs of handling and transporting the particular mail involved, rather than 
paying rates reflecting an average of many different costs and circumstances. 
For example, mail which currently moves by surface might be moved as 
fill-up mail in containers that would otherwise be only partly filled. 1 1 1 
The basic source of most of the benefits the Postal Service expects to reap 
from contracting is increased carrier competition for its business. This com­
petition could produce lower rates, or it might lead to better-timed 
schedules, extra mail handling, novel forms of service, or assured capacity. 
It might, for example, prevent the Postal Service from again being forced to 
give up the lower rates which were associated with the carriage of first class 
mail on a space-available basis in order to secure what it regarded as 
adequate levels of aircraft space committed to the carriage of mail. 1 12 The
Postal Service apparently suspects that some carriers would find the mix of 
business and rates that the Postal Service could direct to it sufficiently attrac­
tive that they would offer more space on more conveniently timed schedules .  
But as long as the rates are negotiated for the whole industry with the Board 
protecting the interests of the carriers and assuring uniformity, and as long as 
Section 101 (f) is interpreted to require equal division of mail dispatched at 
CAB rates, 1 13 carriers have little incentive to offer more favorable terms to 
the Postal Service. If the Board allows the special rate or service, other car­
riers will have an equal right to the business. If the new rate or service in­
volves consolidation of dispatches, sharing the business may make it un­
economic. If the others cannot match the proposal, the Board may not allow it 
because of its effect on the non-participating carriers. 
The scheduled carriers and the CAB have opposed expansion of the Postal 
Service's right to contract for air transportation for a variety of reasons. 
Among the most important of these is the argument that the existence of 
joint costs coupled with very low incremental costs of providing by-product 
space means that airlines competing for contracts would drive the price for 
carrying mail well below its present level, with the result that the mail would 
not pay its share of system costs. 1 14 The claim is somewhat inconsistent with 
1 1 0  Postal Oversight, pt. 5 ,  at 3. 
1 1 1  Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 4, 
112 Postal Oversight, pt. S, at 40, 4 1 .
1 13 Postal Oversight, pt. 1 ,  at 261-263.
1 14 Postal Oversight, pt. 2 ,  at 107.
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the carriers' accepting the need for, and indeed eagerly proposing, thousands 
of specific commodity freight rates at levels between incremental and fully 
allocated costs. In the past, the Board has approved general commodity 
freight rates based on fully allocated costs but insisted on applying them only 
to traffic which was not very price sensitive. When a carrier wished to capture 
the freight business of a shipper with a relatively price-elastic demand for air 
transportation, they negotiated a specific commodity rate for the particular 
product over a particular route. The carrier then filed that rate as an addition 
to the tariff. Although the tariff filing differs from a contract in that it is 
subject to suspension by the Board if the Board thinks it is too low and in that 
it is nominally available to all shippers of that commodity between the points 
for which it is filed, in practice a great many of these low rates have not been 
suspended and therefore the benefit has been confined to the one shipper who 
wished to move that commodity over that route. Obviously, the Board and 
the carriers feel that the Postal Service has fewer alternatives and should be 
forced to pay the equivalent of the general commodity rate. It should be noted 
that, however mistakenly, the Board has recently' 15 moved to put most 
freight rates on a fully allocated cost basis, which would make its treatment of 
freight and mail more consistent. 
Other arguments for uniform rates well above incremental costs are based 
on the alleged need to finance below-cost services on lightly-travelled routes 
with excess revenues on high-density routes. 1 16 A related argument is that 
since service is provided in both passenger-cargo and all cargo aircraft and 
since the proportion of traffic that mail represents differs greatly from flight 
to flight, incremental cost varies and rates have to be averaged to provide an 
overall profit. 1 1 7  Both of these arguments tend to assume that there are some 
excessive and some deficient rates in the system, but that in the end it all 
"averages out" at a "fair" level. 1 1 8  These arguments are ultimately based on 
a misconception which also seems occasionally to invade the thinking of the 
Postal Service, namely that there is some sort of "need" for postal transpor­
tation which is independent of what it costs to provide service, and that 
there is some minimum reasonable rate for that amount of service. If there is 
belly space available in a scheduled passenger flight at virtually zero incre­
mental costs, the rates ought to reflect the situation, so that the Postal 
Service can make efficient choices in dispatching mail. The convenience of a 
primarily postal schedule should be balanced against the additional cost 
involved in getting service in dedicated vehicles or as a substantial portion of 
the available space on a prime-time cargo flight. And airlines should con-
1 15 Dom'estic Air Freight Rate Investigation, Docket No. 22859, at 1 7  (April 15,  1975).
1 1 6 Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 107.
1 l 1  Jd. 
1 1 1  Postal Modernization 415.
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sider rates based on incremental costs when establishing a flight schedule. 
The Postal Service has recognized this principle in planning such operations 
as the daylight container program.1 1 9  But its complaints that airlines were 
"refusing" first class mail dispatched at space-available rates120 suggest 
either that it wanted something for nothing or that it did not understand the 
tradeoffs involved in using the lower rates. 
A variation of the average cost and internal subsidy arguments which has 
been put forward by the carriers and the Board in defending the CAB's rate 
structure is the "system" argument. 12 1  This is the assertion that airlines offer 
a complex network of services balanced among cargo, mail, and passengers 
and between service to smaller communities and service to larger com· 
munities. It is urged that any revision in the regulatory structure which 
would either lower rates on some segments or otherwise increase competition 
would ultimately degrade the total system by impairing the ability of the 
carriers to support low-density parts of the network. This argument is an 
updated version of the internal subsidy justification for regulation in general 
and is subject to the same defects I have identified elsewhere . "'  If customers 
value the network aspect of the system, they will pay for it, and airline 
earnings will tend toward equality on more dense and less dense segments as 
investment is shifted toward profit opportunities. If subsidy for particular 
routes is deemed desirable for non-economic reasons, it is not at all clear why 
a particular class of people who happen to use related services but do not 
benefit directly from the uneconomic services should be singled out to support 
the unprofitable portions of the network. 
Still another variation on this theme is the claim, popular in the Congress 
during the pendency of the Postal Reorganization Act, 123 that mail revenues 
are disproportionately important to the health of the industry, so the indus­
try "needs" this contribution to profit. Implicit in this argument is the prem­
ise that the nation needs airlines and will not have them unless they are 
allowed to make supercompetitive profits on certain portions of their busi­
ness. This claim, which would sound strange if it were given as a justifica­
tion for price-fixing activity by a steel company, is no better grounded than 
the arguments already discussed. There is no reason why the considerable 
demand for airline service on the parts of passengers, shippers, and the 
Postal Service cannot be satisfied at rates that reflect the marginal costs of 
production or in the case of joint costs, at rates associated with maximizing 
output subject to the constraint that total revenue is equal to total cost. 
1 19 Postal Oversight, pt. 21 at 247 (quest. #4).
120 Id., pt. I ,  at 254, 255.
iii  Postal Modernization 4 131 414.
122 Comment [by Michael E. LevineJ, supra�note 85.
UJ Id. a:t 24-25. 
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While this may mean that certain users (including from time to time the 
Postal Service) will pay more for certain services or get less of certain ser­
vices than they would at an artifically uniform rate, output will be better 
tailored overall to the value placed on the resources used to produce it. 
Keeping mail carriage rates at higher-than-necessary levels simply contrib­
utes to an inefficient pattern of production of airline services as a whole, 
although it may benefit particular users in particular circumstances. 
It should be emphasized that nothing in this analysis requires that the mail 
rate always be lower than freight or passenger rates. It may be more efficient 
for postal users to bear a relatively high proportion of capacity costs on 
certain flights. If the Postal Service particularly wants service at a time 
relatively unattractive to passengers and shippers, mail rates should be set 
high relative to the others. Then passenger and freight rates can be lowered 
to attract greater total revenues and thus pay for more output than would 
result from a different distribution of capacity costs. Under such cir­
cumstances the Postal Service might be led to conclude that its rates were 
unfairly high, but such a rate structure would make possible Postal Service 
use of capacity whose total costs could not otherwise be covered, thus leav­
ing the Postal Service better off. In those instances, especially "profitable" 
Postal Service would support "needed" airline service to the general benefit, 
but also to the particular benefit of the Postal Service. But this does not 
justify uniform mail rates higher than passenger and freight rates. Such rates 
do not take into account the costs and demands associated with any particu­
lar flight, and would produce efficient results on particular flights only by 
coincidence. 
The Board and the carriers regard contracting as unnecessary as well as 
undesirable. They have argued that all that the Postal Service wants to 
achieve through additional contracting authority-except lower rates on 
mail now carried by the airlines-can be gotten by using existing 
mechanisms. 1 24 The Board is said to be flexible enough to allow lower rates 
for classes of mail not now carried by air, as long as high rates for existing 
classes of mail are not eroded. The tariff mechanism could be used to 
achieve this, much as freight shippers and carriers use the tariff mechanism 
to negotiate specific commodity rates. 1 25 The carriers and the Board point 
out that the required service provisions126 of the Federal Aviation Act al­
ready provide the Postal Service with a mechanism for tailoring schedules 
and service to its requirements. And they argue that the Postal Service has 
not used the contracting provisions" '  of the Postal Reorganization Act, and 
124 Postal Modernization 418, 419.
125 Id. at 413.
126 Federal Aviation Act 49 U.S.C. § 137S(b) (1958). 
121 Supra note 63.
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that its failure to do so proves that expanded contracting authority will only 
be used to lower rates on existing traffic and not to expand the flexibility of 
service and enable new postal traffic to move by air . 1 28 The Postal Service 
rejoins that as long as the Board can suspend tariffs which it feels are too low 
and set the rate for any service which carriers are ordered to provide by the 
Postmaster General, these provisions will not produce the needed improve­
ments in service and rate structure. 
Finally, the Board and the carriers charge that although the Postal Service 
has repeatedly testified that it wants merely to be treated as an airline 
customer, it is requesting in the form of unlimited contract authority a status 
not available to any other airline user-the ability to deal with the carriers 
free of the Board's regulation. 129 The Board claims that it is not airline­
oriented, but rather public interest-oriented, and that the public interest 
requires consideration of the needs of the carriers, other shippers and pas­
sengers, and the public at large in setting mail rates and regulations. In 
effect, the carriers and Board charge the Postal Service with being preoc­
cupied with saving money at the expense of the greater public weal. This 
posture has the political virtue of making the Postal Service's search for 
operating economies seem petty and self-serving while the Board's and car­
riers' efforts to preserve above-cost rates for carrying mail take on the 
character of a crusade for public good. The tactic is an inspired one and has, 
as noted above, resulted in the odd spectacle of a Congress nominally con­
cerned about Postal Service efficiency and the elimination of deficits champ­
ioning excess payments of public funds to private carriers in the name of a 
higher public purpose. 
This approach to the Congress is undoubtedly more successful than it 
might otherwise be as a result of its natural evolution from the history of 
Post Office-airline relations set out in Part I. The claim on postal monies as 
an especially important source of profit support would seem much less 
public-oriented if it were not descended from the historic role of mail pay as 
the main support for fledgling carriers and the main public instrument in 
shaping the modern domestic airline industry. The case for fully-allocated 
cost rates for by-product service owes much to the rate formula of the 
Airmail Act of 1934, which provided payment for capacity offered rather 
than mail actually carried in an effort to increase the output of the by­
product service of the time-passenger transportation. And the Board's role 
in insulating the airlines from competition with each other in dealing with 
the Postal Service is an integral part of the regulatory scheme nominally 
enacted in 1938, but actually instituted in the provisions of the 1934 Act 
us Postal Oversight, pt. 2 ,  at 107. 
129 Postal Modernization 412-417 .  
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giving the power to set rates for the renewal of airmail contracts to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Most of the Postal Service's claimed benefits from contracting and most of 
the evils feared by the carriers are a product of the implicit absence of Board 
protection for the carriers, rather than from any feature of the contract 
mechanism itself. If contracting were allowed but all contracts had to have 
Board approval and the Board rejected all those that did not advance airline 
profits, contracting would probably not be very attractive to the Postal 
Service. Indeed, if the Board retained an active role, it is difficult to see how 
contracting would differ from the use of the tariff mechanism, a procedure 
which is supported by the Board and the carriers130 and which the Postal 
Service professes to regard as cumbersome. The Postal Service has said that 
it would be willing to accept contracting subject to rapid Board review. 131  
Presumably, the Postal Service either believes that the Board could not 
review contracts within the period proposed or simply regards Board super­
vision as a temporary expedient to be discarded once the contract 
mechanism became entrenched. Although the Postal Service has occasion­
ally aimed its criticisms of Board rate-setting at institutional techniques, 
rather than at the Board itself, 132 it seems unlikely that any mechanism 
which involved active CAB protection of the carriers would produce results 
acceptable to the Postal Service. Conversely, any mechanism which resulted 
in individual airlines dealing with the Postal Service without the Board 
acting as cartel manager, whether on the basis of individual or general rates, 
specific tariffs, or contracts, would be likely to produce results more satisfac­
tory to the Postal Service than the present arrangements . 
The Postal Service,s preoccupation with the contract mechanism as the
vehicle for revolutionary change in its relationship with the scheduled car­
riers must rest either on a general preference for uniformity of institutional 
patterns among different modes of transportation procurement, or on some 
unarticulated political judgment that the contract concept has more promise 
for reducing the CAB's role in the process than any other. The carriers' 
resistance to the contract concept must similarly rest either on a judgment 
that the Board will be unable to monitor contracts with the vigilance that it 
can monitor uniform rates or tariffs, or on the political judgment that the 
contract issue with its overtones of the troubles of the pre-1938 era focuses 
Congressional attention on the legislative history of the regulatory scheme in 
a way that insures its survival. Whatever their intent, by casting their 
opposition to a smaller role for the Board in airmail transportation procure-
130 See Postal Modernization 417, 42 7.
131 Postal Oversight, pt. l,  at 261 .
Ul Postal Modernization 389-393. 
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ment in terms of the historic contract issue, the carriers and the agency itself 
have created an effective Congressional shield for their own interests. 
A related effort to develop contract alternatives to mail carriage by 
scheduled carriers at CAB-set rates has been the greatly expanded use of 
contracts with air taxi operators. Expenditures for air taxi services grew 
from about $3.39 million in Fiscal Year 1968 to an estimated $19 million in 
Fiscal Year 1974.133 This very large increase is accounted for by both a 
considerable expansion in the scale of operations and a decision to use 
sophisticated (and expensive) jet aircraft on certain routes. 134 Air taxi opera­
tions are more expensive per ton-mile than any CAB-set rate. 135 The Postal 
Service uses them because they can often provide service on schedules more 
convenient for mail carriage than flights timed for passenger or cargo traffic 
by the scheduled certificated carriers. 
The fact that air taxi rates are already higher than CAB rates might seem 
to suggest that use of air taxi service is independent of any defects in the 
CAB-established rate structure, but this is probably not the case. While 
there may be some mail which must be moved by the very fastest means 
possible, much of the mail carried by air taxis is first class mail whose 
senders did not value speed enough even to spend a few cents extra for faster 
handling by paying airmail postage -"6 The ability of the Postal Service to 
justify carrying this mail by air taxi depends on its ability to reconcile the 
resulting service improvements with the additional cost. To the extent that 
uniformly high CAB rates for loose-sack mail narrow the cost spread be­
tween air taxi service and combination service, they distort Postal Service 
choices. This is nowhere more apparent than in the Postal Service's use of 
cargo configuration executive jets to haul mail at ton-mile costs more than 
double the prevailing CAB rate. The Postal Service justifies this program 
because it improves service, but the unit cost advantage of larger airline type 
aircraft in off-peak use is so great that the certificated carriers would undoubt­
edly bid much lower than CAB rates in order to keep the business. They 
might, for example, operate night flights at very low passenger fares, with 
mail revenues paying a larger-than-usual share of the costs and the low fares 
attracting passengers who would otherwise find the late-night schedule unat-
133 Treasury, Postal Service & General Government Appropriations, supra note 82, at 169, 
id. 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 626. 
134 See Air Taxi Study, prepared by Swygert Associates for the Air Transport Association of 
America [hereinafter cited as Air Taxi Study], reproduced in Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 115, 
119, 134-5, 155. 
135 The lowest ton-mile rate included in the comprehensive list of air taxi contracts found in 
Air Taxi Study, Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 150-66, is approximately $.35 per ton-mile, Lub­
bock, Texas-Abilene, Texas, Ross Aviation, id., 162. CAB rates for certificated carriers are 
about $.25 per ton-mile, supra note 90. 
136 Postal Oversight, pt. S, at 145. 
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tractive. Money saved by using combination service could be used to improve 
mail operations other than actual air carriage. 137 
Another potential source of contract competition for Postal Service traffic 
are the supplemental carriers. These carriers were created in 1962138 as a 
class of charter specialists. Their CAB certificates authorize them to provide 
passenger and freight charter service in and between specified regions (for 
example, U.S. domestic). The certificates do not authorize them to carry 
mail on a regular basis. While the Postal Reorganization Act was being 
considered in the Congress, the supplementals requested that their cer­
tificates be changed to permit them to carry mail on a contract basis, both on 
regular passenger and freight charters and on ad hoc operations. 139 They 
suggested that Postal Service costs would probably be lowered as a result of 
the added competition and cited the military charter market as an example 
of both the type of arrangement they proposed and the likely result.140 As far 
as I have been able to determine, 141 the Postal Service was in favor of the 
proposal and it was incorporated into H . R. 17070 when that bill was in­
troduced as the revised Administration Bill in 1970. 142
This proposal met the same fate as the other liberalized contracting provi­
sions of H.R. 17070, but it presented interesting possibilities. Supplementals 
often operate a sustained series of charter flights between important tourist 
destinations, arranging their flights so as to eliminate empty legs (these are 
called "back to back" charters in the trade). In addition, many charter flights 
are booked months in advance, and the Postal Service could easily be no­
tified of their impending operation. Charter flights produce by-product 
capacity which could be used to carry mail, much as do the scheduled 
117 A somewhat exotic justification for jet air taxi operations might be constructed under the 
following circumstances: Suppose the Postal Service were committed to provide the fastest 
possible service for a special class of priority mail regardless of rate, and to pass the increased 
costs on to patrons desiring such premium service. Suppose in addition that only late-night jet 
service could provide the rapid service needed and the scheduled carriers did not operate at 
those hours. If the priority customers were willing to pay tht cost of a jet charter and the jet 
always had room for more mail than was tendered at priority rates then it would make sense to 
operate jet taxis and to carry non-priority mail on a fill-up basis. In reality, airmail is certainly 
not offered as a cost-no-object priority service, postal rates are not set to reflect the costs of jet 
air taxi, and many of the routes operated are too short for the extra speed of the jet to be 
significant. See, for example, Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 65, where a Postal Service spokesman 
refers to a jet taxi being used to carry mail between Washington, D.C. and New York, a route 
over which the additional speed of a jet could save no more than 15 minutes over pn;ipeller 
service. 
138 Act of July 10, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-528, 76 Stat. 143 amending 49 U.S.C. § 1301 
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1963)). 
u9 Postal Modernization 433. 
140 Id. 434, 435. 
14 1  Id. 434. In 1973 the Postal Service indicated that it favored such authority for supplemen­
tals. Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 139, 147. 
142 H.R. Rep. No. 17070 § 853 ( 1970). 
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carriers (although supplementals carry more passengers per flight than do 
scheduled carriers using the same aircraft and hence use more of the 
weight-carrying capacity of any given flight). This by-product space is cur­
rently wasted, since the supplemental is not permitted to sell it, either to the 
Postal Service or, under most conditions, to private shippers other than the 
primary charterer. While the somewhat irregular nature of charter opera­
tions suggests that they will never be a major source of Postal Service 
transportation, such by-product space as they do provide could be made 
available at very low cost on a contract basis. The overall result of continu­
ing the prohibition on supplemental carriers transporting mail is the same as 
with all the prohibitions on contracting-it prevents the efficient use of 
existing capacity and encourages wasteful patterns of operation by the Postal 
Service. 
Postal Service dissatisfaction with airline schedules has been a major 
source of conflict between postal officials, carriers, and the CAB. The Postal 
Service has complained that the carriers schedule for passenger traffic, that 
this traffic does not move at prime mail hours Qate night), and therefore that 
the Postal Service has only limited service at hours convenient to it. This 
claim was raised variously during the hearings on the Postal Reorganization 
Act143 and during the Postal Oversight Hearings144 as a justification for 
expanded contracting power, as an explanation for expanded use of expen­
sive air taxi service, and as a reason why lower rates are justified. The Postal 
Service position is that the carriers have an obligation under the Federal 
Aviation Act to provide mail service, that this service should include service 
properly timed for mail, and that the Postal Service pays rates based on fully 
allocated costs and is therefore entitled to better treatment.145 
The carriers argue that mail represents only a fraction of the revenue 
generated by most flights and that it is impractical to schedule flights for 
mail alone. Where there is substantial mail revenue available at a certain 
hour, the carrier takes it into account in its scheduling.146 The carriers claim 
as well that the Postal Service is too inflexible and rejects tenders of service 
on flights operating on schedules only a few minutes different from those it 
requests. 147 The intricate scheduling problems created for both the airlines 
and the Postal Service by a complex network of operations can make seem­
ingly small problems of adjustment impossible.148 Finally, the carriers and 
143 Postal Modernization 404. 
144 Post Office Reorganization hearings before the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil 
Service, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 5, at 37 ( 1969) [hereinafter cited as Postal Reorganization]. 
145 Postal Oversight, pt. S '· at 3 7, 38, 40, 4 1 .
146 See Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 232.
147 Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 109. 
148 Jd., pt. 2, at 178, 179, 215 .
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the Board both point out149 that the Federal Aviation Act empowers150 the 
Postmaster General to order an airline to operate a schedule for the conveni­
ence of the Postal Service, the Board retaining its general power to fix "fair 
and reasonable" rates ·for such service. 1 51  
The Postal Service historically had been reluctant to use the required 
service provisions of the Federal Aviation Act, probably because it feared 
that CAB proceedings would take too long and that the Board would set 
compensation for such service at unacceptably high rates. 152 The authority 
was unused for more than thirty-five years, and the Board and the carriers 
made effective use of that fact in opposing expanded Postal Service authority 
both in 1969-1970 and 1973. But in late 1973, Eastern Airlines informed the 
Postal Service that it intended to discontinue a Boston-New York-Atlanta 
late night flight that had been carrying substantial amounts of mail. On 
January 3, 1974, the Postmaster General issued an order153 under 405(b) of 
the Federal Aviation Act154 requiring Eastern to retain the flight. Eastern 
immediately appealed to the Civil Aeronautics Board, which issued an or­
der155 on January 1 1 ,  1974 , granting review of the Postmaster General's 
order and postponed its effect pending final Board action. The Board took 
no further action in the matter for two months, notwithstanding the provi­
sion of 405(b) requiring it to "give preference to proceedings under this 
subsection over all proceedings pending before it." The Postal Service 
pointed this out to the Board in two motions for expeditious action, the 
second observing on March 8, 1974, that there had been other Board actions 
in the interim. 
The Board responded on March 13 with an order156 to show cause why 
the flight should not be continued provided compensation was paid. It 
reinstated the Postmaster General's order pending a final determination and 
set a temporary rate to be paid during the interim, subject to retroactive 
adjustment. The Board noted in its order that this was an important case of 
first impression that required a balancing of postal needs with its obligation 
to foster and promote economically sound air transportation. 1 57 In sub-
149 Id., pt. 2, at 107; Postal Modernization 413.
1so Federal Aviation Act, 49 U . S.C. § 1375(b) ( 1963). 
isi Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1376(a) (1963).
is2 See Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 90. 
1n This Order and the subsequent pleadings and Civil Aeronautics Board Orders form 
Docket 26290 and are on file in the Docket Section at the Civil Aeronautics Board in 
Washington, D.C. The Docket, which is public.record, will not ordinarily be published, but the 
Board Orders in the proceeding may ultimately be published in Civil Aeronautics Board Re­
ports. 
154 See supra note 126. 
1s5 Order 74-1-15, Jan. 1 1 ,  1974. See supra note 153. 
156 Order 74-3-59, March 13, 1974. See supra note 153.
1s1 1d. at 2-3.
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sequent argument, Eastern urged158 that there was a fuel shortage, that 
belly capacity was available on flights at other hours, that the Postal Service 
tender (12,000-16,000 lbs. per night) was insufficient to justify the operation 
of a Boeing 727 (the minimum size aircraft that would accept the Postal 
Service containers), and that the schedule pattern in this market was not 
different from other markets in which no such order had previously been 
issued. The Postal Service reiterated'" its complaints that the carriers gave 
insufficient importance to mail needs in scheduling flights and then cited the 
CAB's own testimony, 160 given during the hearings on the Postal Reorgani­
zation Act, to the effect that contract authority was not needed because the 
Board stood ready to cooperate with the Postal Service in the exercise of its 
rights under 405(b). It noted that the other markets cited by Eastern were 
being served other ways, two by the sort of jet air taxi service to which the 
airlines had so vehemently objected in the Postal Oversight Hearings the 
summer before. 
Since it was clear that the Board was going to allow the Postal Service to 
require the schedule, the principal dispute in connection with the final order 
was over rates. This debate reproduced in microcosm most of the historic 
differences between postal authorities and the carriers over costing 
methodology and rate levels. The show-cause order had set a rate based on 
the then-existing temporary mail rate (recall that mail rates are frequently 
"open" during the period for which they are in effect), with a minimum of 
$2 ,500 per flight. The Board was here applying its historic method of using 
fully allocated costs over the whole system, modifying it to reflect the re­
quired character of the service only by providing a minimum in case very 
little mail was tendered. Eastern, on the other hand, requested a rate based 
on incremental costs for that flight, plus "fully allocated" overhead and a 
1 2  per cent rate of return. As Eastern calculated it, this method would have 
yielded a payment of $10,350 per flight. 16 1  The Postal Service generally 
supported the Board's use of regular mail rate. On May 20, 1974, the Board 
issued a final order adopting the regular temporary mail rate (subject to 
revision when that rate became final) and the $2, 500 minimum. In its order, 
the Board noted that although the rate adopted would not cover fully al­
located costs, it would cover incremental costs and make a "substantial 
contribution" toward overheads. 162
This controversy reflects an interesting reversal of positions by the con-
158 Eastern Airlines Notice of Objection, March 20, 1974, CAB Docket 26290. See supra note 
153. 
159 U.S. Postal Service Notice of Objection, March 22, 1974, CAB Docket 26290. See supra 
note 153. 
160 Post Office Reorganization, pt. 3, at 1147. 
16 1  Eastern Airlines Answer, March 27, 1974, Docket 26290. See supra note 153. 
162 Civil Aeronautics Board, Order 74�5-93, May 20, 1974, p. 3. See supra note 153.
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tending parties. The Postal Service, ordinarily an opponent of system-wide 
uniform rates, was perfectly willing to support them when, as here, the 
result was a rate lower than it was likely to be on an individual contract 
basis. (We can deduce that the minimum amount for which Eastern was 
willing to operate this flight was more than the mail revenues it would earn 
at regular rates from the fact that Eastern originally discontinued it.) East­
ern, which we can assume ordinarily favored system-wide mail rates which 
did not reflect the low incremental costs associated with mail carriage on 
most of its flights, found the virtues of system rates which were "fair" overall 
unappealing in this instance. The Board seemed unlikely, given its initial 
two-month silence, to act more expeditiously this time than in the past, but 
found itself able to go forward with the matter five days after receiving a 
Postal Service threat to litigate the delay. Some implications of these am­
biguities of position will be discussed in Part III, infra. However, one ines­
capable conclusion is that many disputes between the Postal Service and the 
carriers are unavoidable results of efforts by each party to extract maximum 
benefits from a rate structure that permits wide deviations between price 
and marginal cost. 
Another example of disputes created by the rate structure is the so-called 
"division of mail" problem. During the subsidy era, the Post Office Depart­
ment used mail pay to encourage the airlines to operate more capacity than 
could be supported by passenger and freight traffic. The Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 continued this method of subsidy. Since mail was the instrument 
of subsidy, mail rates were set so that each carrier was paid a rate that would 
allow it to operate the desired level of capacity. Since a rate could only be 
paid if the mail were carried, the Post Office adopted the practice of dis­
patching mail equally to flights of approximately equal postal value. The 
practice came to be known as "division of mail." It tended to reduce the 
differences between subsidy mail rates paid to each carrier, and created 
some incentives for rivalry163 to provide schedules convenient to the Post 
Office. 
After the subsidy era ended, division continued. It is not at all clear why 
the Post Office Department should have found it advantageous to continue 
the practice, but for the carriers equal division helped keep service rivalry 
163 Some of this service rivalry still exists, even though mail payments are ordinarily a 
relatively small proportion of a flight's total revenue and hence operations are usually scheduled 
to attract passengers rather than mail . Some adjustments to attract mail dispatches will be 
made and, particularly at off-peak hours, mail payments will occasionally represent a sig­
nificant proportion of a flight's potential revenue and a carrier will adjust schedules to attract 
mail. In recent years, as the Postal Service has placed more emphasis on reducing airmail 
procurement costs, it now often values price reductions at least equally with service improve­
ments. As a result, carriers now have considerable incentives to discover methods of price 
competition that are compatible with the Board's regulatory and rate structure. 
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within bounds. When a carrier considered adding service convenient to the 
Post Office, it had to consider the probable reaction of a rival "entitled" to an 
equal share of the mail if the service were matched. The obstacles posed by 
any indivisibilities in the production of mail capacity (common in by-product 
service at relatively low load factors) would be magnified by the obligation to 
split the business, thus tending to limit schedule rivalry for mail revenues 
and to distribute more equally among rivals any economic profits from mail 
carriage. Ultimately the Post Office came to see division as an obstacle in its 
efforts to increase carrier competition for mail business. By 1969) the De­
partment's attempts to gain near-absolute freedom in airmail transportation 
procurement clearly included an intention to abandon the division concept. 
Indeed, this intention was the motivating factor behind ultimately successful 
carrier attempts to include § lOl(f) in the Postal Reorganization Act. 
An important test of the degree to which § 10l(f)164 restricts the Postal 
Service's right to dispatch mail as it sees fit occurred in 1973, virtually 
contemporaneously with the Postal Oversight Hearings. Effective February 
5, 197 3, the Postal Service decided to drop division and substitute a policy of 
consolidating traffic for tender unless dividing would produce a •iclear ben­
efit" to the Postal Service. 1 65 Carriers offering important service or rate 
improvements were to continue to receive consolidated dispatches even if 
rivals duplicated the original improvement, until superior service was•of­
fered and the process repeated. This new policy was buttressed by Postal 
Service interpretation of § lOl(f) that read the "fair and equitable distribu­
tion" clause as applying only if the Postal Service would gain no advantage 
from consolidation. Since other language in § lOl(f) enjoined the Postal 
Service to "give highest consideration to the prompt and economical delivery 
of all mail", and the Postal Service believed that both technical savings and 
the economic benefits of competition could be achieved by consolidation of 
dispatches to carriers offering new service or rate benefits, the Postal Service 
argued that it was legally entitled to end the division program. 166 Given the 
spread between rates and costs on most flights, dropping the division pro­
gram could be expected to produce considerable carrier rivalry, and it did. 
164 "Postal policy. (f) In selecting modes of transportation, the Postal Service shall give 
highest consideration to the prompt and economical delivery of all mail and shall make a fair 
and equitable distribution of mail business to carriers providing similar modes of transportation 
services to the Postal Service. Modern methods of transporting mail by containerization and 
programs designed to achieve overnight transportation to the destination of important letter 
mall to all parts of the Nation shall be a primary goal of postal operations. "  39 U .S.C. § 101 
(1970). 
165 U.S. Postal Service, Methods Handbook, Serie's M-31, § 142 . I  (1973), reproduced in 
Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 196-7. 
166 U.S. Postal Service, answer to Motion for Issuance of Order to Show Cause, July 9, 19731
at 3-4, CAB Docket 23080, et al., reproduced in Postal Oversight, pt. 2 ,  at 205, 207-8.
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As part of an effort to introduce containerization on a large scale into 
airmail service, the Postal Service adopted a policy of consolidating non­
priority mail for dispatch to the first carrier to offer container service in a 
market. Since many markets involved mail volumes such that relatively 
little business (mostly priority airmail being dispatched to the next conve­
nient flight) would b,e left for non-containerized carriers, not being the first to 
offer such service meant a very substantial loss of business. This program 
was coupled with an attempt to obtain a favorable rate for containers ship­
ped during daytime (which is an off-peak period for mail and freight). In 
March, 1973, under circumstances that came to be disputed, 167 Flying Tiger 
Lines, an all-cargo carrier then carrying relatively little mail, offered the 
Postal Service containerized service on both priority and nonpriority bases. 
The offer of nonpriority service was accompanied by an application to the 
CAB requesting approval of a low non-weight-related charge per container 
for the service.168 On March 28, 1973,  the Postal Service began tendering 
mail to Flying Tiger and making "progress payments" at the requested rate 
pending approval of the application . United and other airlines immediately 
offered equivalent service but, pursuant to the new policy, the Postal Service 
consolidated dispatches to Flying Tiger. 
The impact was dramatic. In the first month of the new program, Flying 
Tiger carried more than five times as much mail as in the previous month . 169 
According to United, Flying Tiger's share of mail traffic in the ten marke.ts 
initially involved rose from 6 .6  per cent to 37.  7 per cent -"0 By July, three 
more carriers, Continental, Northwest, and Western, had made proposals in 
markets other than those served by Flying Tiger, and the Postal Service was 
tendering containers to them. United's response was to file "defensively" a 
proposal to match the competing service, but the Postal Service continued its 
policy of tendering mail to the carriers initiating the improvements. The 
Postal Service clearly intended to continue to promote a competitive en-
167 Both in their lawsuit and at the Postal Oversight hearings, the carriers accused the Postal 
Setvice of having negotiated the daylight container rate and setvice, contending that as a result 
the program was being carried on pursuant to a contract within the meaning of § 5402(a) of the 
Postal Reorganization Act. 39 U .S.C. § 5402(a). The Postal Seivice denied having negotiated, 
U.S. Postal Service Answer supra note 166, at 3, and both the Postal Setvice and Flying Tiger 
denied the existence of a contract. Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 291. But it is clear from both the 
complexity of the program and A. S. Razetti's (New York Regional Director of Logistics for the 
Postal Service) memorandum of March 26, 1973, reproduced at Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 249, 
that substantial coordination between the Postal Service and Flying Tiger must have occurred 
prior to the airline's filing for the new rate. 
168 Petition of Flying Tiger Line, Inc., CAB Docket 25343. See note 153, supra for source 
information on CAB Dockets. 
169 Affidavit of Andrew M. deVoursney, July 24, 1973, at 6. Reproduced in Postal Oversight, 
pt. 2, at 266, 271. 
110 Id. 
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vironment in which carriers would offer service and rate improvements in an 
effort to greatly increase their share of the combined mail traffic on any given 
segment. 
The excluded carriers turned to the courts, claiming that the Postal Ser­
vice had violated the mandate of § 101(1) of the Postal Reorganization Act in 
not fairly and equitably distributing mail business among carriers offering 
similar services. The carriers were assisted in this contention by exchanges 
between Senator McGee and Postal Service witnesses in the March Postal 
Oversight Hearings which had made fairly clear that the legislative intent of 
the Congress had been to impose division on the Postal Service by means of 
§ 101(1). 171 The carriers filed suit on July 30, 1973. By August, the Postal 
Service, apparently fearing a definitive adverse ruling on the meaning of 
§ 101(1), and perhaps looking forward as well to a resumption of the Postal 
Oversight Hearings, had settled the suit and agreed to divide containers 
among carriers offering competing services and even to rotate them among 
carriers in markets which could fill only one container per day.172 Neverthe­
less, the Postal Service continued to assert the position that § 101(1) did not 
mandate division of mail. In a written answer to a question addressed to 
them by Senator McGee, Postmaster General Klassen stated that: 
. . .  nothing could be more unfair and inequitable [emphasis in original] than a forced 
division of mail which deprives a carrier, who had come forward with a proposal 
that will materially advance prompt and economical delivery by modern methods of 
the traffic that is necessary to the economic success of his proposal. Nothing in the 
Act, as we understand it, requires any distribution of mail that would be uneconomic 
. .  or discourage advances in promptness, economy, and modernization. 173 
The division issue and the required service problem illustrate different 
aspects of the difficulties inherent in restraining competition and imposing 
uniform rates on postal purchases of air transportation. For most operations, 
the uniform rates produce economic profits, which make dividing business 
among carriers a major source of political conflict. In addition, the criteria 
used for division (traditionally, frequency of service) may exclude a carrier 
from its "rightful" share of the business. In that event, the carrier may well 
attempt to increase its share of the business by competing. 174 In most indus­
tries in which profits are produced by maintaining fixed rates, quarrels over 
divisions of business are a major threat to stable noncompetitive market 
arrangements. The legislation governing the airline industry attempts to 
prevent rate competition for market shares by giving the Board the power to 
17 1  Postal Oversight, pt. l, at 260-63. 
112 Postal Oversight, pt. 5, at 39. 
113 Jd. at 138, 143. 
174 See for example, Postal Oversight, pt. 2, at 290-91. 
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disapprove rates it regards as unreasonably loW. But the Board,s inability to 
set rates quickly created the tradition of "progress payments" on "open" (not 
formally approved) rates which Flying Tiger exploited so successfully. Un­
less the Board is prepared to suspend all innovations until it approves the 
associated rates, opportunities for competition will continue to exist. If the 
Board were to adopt the policy of suspension, it would find itself pressed to 
defend itself in Congress against Postal Service charges of inflexibility. 
Ironically, the Board's difficulty in requiring Eastern to retain the 
Boston-Atlanta flight stems from the same sources as the "excess competi­
tion" problem. The political acceptability of fixed uniform rates depends 
very heavily on variants of the cross-subsidy argument. For the Board to 
openly approve a much higher rate when a carrier found a particular flight 
financially unattractive because of poor passenger or freight traffic would 
greatly hamper its ability to defend the uniform rates on the much greater 
number of flights operated primarily for passengers and freight where mail 
revenues greatly exceed the cost of providing mail service as a by-product. 
Perhaps the most interesting facet of these episodes is their illustration 
that the form in which rates are established is unrelated to their content. The 
Eastern rate was set under the Board's standard procedure (§ 406 of the 
Federal Aviation Act), and the Flying Tiger and subsequent container rates 
were set under that authority as well. Both of those results could have been 
equally well achieved as specific commodity rates in a tariff proposal or as 
contracts. The common denominator of the rather favorable outcomes for 
the Postal Service (from a rate standpoint) was the Board's inability for 
political reasons to protect the carriers. The PostaJ Service's preoccupation 
with contracting as a cure for its problems in dealing with the airlines misses 
the central issue. Contracting, tariffs, or rate setting (with temporary rates 
and progress payments) all can produce competition among carriers for the 
Postal Service's business, if the Board allows them to. Contracting subject to 
Board approval is no more likely to produce competition than any other 
method, and no less. Tariff approval and rate setting can take as much or as 
little time as contract approval. The crucial issue is the political environment 
in which the CAB operates. If that environment is favorable to operating a 
government-run cartel for the carriers, the Board will do so. If not, competi­
tion will arise very quickly. 
Of course, the Postal Service is right in one respect-maximum benefits 
from competition would be achieved by a contracting regime outside the 
jurisdiction of the CAB. This would eliminate the possibility of anticom­
petitive acitivity on the part of the Board as well as saving litigation, delay, 
and uncertainty costs. But given the political history of contracting, the 
Congressional history of airline regulation, and the carriers' potent Con-
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gressional position (reaffirmed in hearings and votes since 1969) elimination 
of the Board's role in mail rate setting is very unlikely. An open question 
therefore remains as to whether a more flexible strategy aimed at relaxing 
rather than eliminating CAB control of the rate setting and tariff process, 
thus releasing the very strong underlying market forces that characterize the 
industry, could successfully introduce many of the benefits of competition 
into postal air transportation procurement. 
III 
There appears to be a kind of historical momentum to the regulatory 
process. Once a relationship is defined between a government agency and a 
regulated party, it resists even explicit governmental efforts to change it. 
The subsidy relationship between the Postal Service and the airlines was 
established early in the airlines' history, and despite at least two explicit 
attempts at revision (the separation of subsidy from mail pay in Reorganiza­
tion Plan No. 10 of 1953 and the attempt by the Administration to create an 
independent non-subsidized and non-subsidizing Postal Service in 1970), 
mail rates still reflect an effort to give the carriers revenues in excess of those 
which they would receive if prices reflected marginal costs. To be sure, the 
degree of forced subsidy and airline protection differs from time to time and 
situation to situation. The carriers won high rates for loose-sack mail car­
riage in the 1973 compromise over mail priority, but the Postal Service 
reaped some of the benefits of competition in the Daylight Container Mail 
program. When the CAB feels Congressional pressure to operate flexibly and 
quickly, it can and does. The Board set a rate for Eastern Airlines Boston­
Atlanta required service very rapidly once it became apparent that the Postal 
Service was in a position to embarrass it. But overall mail rates still take 
years to set and are obsolete once final. Despite the occasional Postal Service 
"victories" cited, the Postal Service deals with a CAB that reflects airlines 
successes in obtaining Congressional protection. 
Congressional solicitude for the airlines is manifested in areas other than 
rates and has endured long past the time when airlines could be considered 
an "infant industry". Division of mail was initiated by the Postal Service to 
implement a subsidy program that encouraged airline development by over­
paying carriers for transporting mail. The carriers have successfully resisted 
efforts to change this practice even though the subsidy program that justified 
it is no longer in effect and notwithstanding the impact of the program on the 
ability of the Postal Service to procure mail transportation more efficiently. 
This suggests that where government-created supercompetitive profits exist, 
apportioning the benefits among favored parties is a delicate job. Once a 
compromise is devised that apportions the profits while suppressing rivalry, 
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the beneficiaries of the policy will have sufficient interest in and means to 
resist changes in the pattern. 
The respective roles of the CAB and the Postal Service on mail trans­
portation issues represent another piece of data in the large and growing 
body of evidence that much regulation represents a government service in 
organizing producers to the detriment of both overall economic efficiency and 
consumer welfare. 175
' 
The Postal Service here is the Government acting in 
the role of consumer or customer. If regulation were a process aimed at 
producing either long- or short-term consumer benefit, one would expect 
that the Postal Service would support rather than oppose CAB or other 
regulatory intervention in the mail procurement process. But at least since 
1969, the Postal Service has generally176 sought to eliminate or reduce the 
role of the CAB in its dealings with air carriers, as it succeeded in virtually 
eliminating the Interstate Commerce Commission in its dealings with sur­
face carriers. The Postal Service has been unsuccessful in doing so, mostly 
due to Congressional solicitude for the financial welfare of the scheduled 
certificated carriers. Undoubtedly, some would object that the Congres­
sional role is necessary to save the Postal Service from the long-term conse­
quences of its present desire to promote competition in the supply of air 
transport services. But it is unclear why the Postal Service alone among 
government agencies cannot be trusted to take the long view of its own 
welfare, let alone the public interest, and why another agency such as the 
CAB can be expected to have a better view. And it is particularly unclear 
why the Postal Service would want to pursue policies that would eliminate 
important suppliers and why the Postal Service's successes in contracting 
with surface carriers without eliminating them should not reassure Congress 
on this point. 
What is there about the organization costs or political characteristics of air 
115 See for example, Paul W. MacAvoy, The Economic Effects of Regulation (1965); Gabriel 
Kolko, Railroads and Regulation: 1877·1916 (1965); Lucille S. Keyes, supra note 14; R. H. 
Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. Law Econ. 1 ( 1959). Attempts at  a 
general theory can be found in George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. 
Econ. & Manag. Sci. 3 (1971); and Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell}. Econ. 
& Manag. Sci. 22 (1971). Theories of regulation are discussed and a bibliography of studies of 
regulation provided in Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & 
Manag. Sci. 335 (1974). 
l76 In formulating its stance toward CAB regulation, the Postal Service has occasionally 
exhibited the same ambivalences that are characteristic of many customers of regulated indus­
tries. Believing that regulation in general imposes higher costs on it, the Postal Service favors 
unlimited contracting authority, that is, deregulation. At the same time, it retains the hope that 
regulation .can bestow benefits by forcing carriers to provide below-cost service in some situa­
tions and eagerly uses the power of the CAB (for example, in the Boston-Atlanta dispute with 
Eastern). The Postal Service has exhibited this same ambivalence in the area of railroad 
transportation, where it has successfully fought to retain the power to require service at ICC 
rates while filling virtually all of its surface transportation needs through unregulated contracts. 
REGULATING AIRMAIL TRANSPORTATION 359 
carriers that has made them more successful at influencing Congress than 
the Postal Service? The Postal Service, a single entity, should have lower 
coalition costs than a group of carriers. And the unpopularity of taxation and 
the opportunity to lower subsidies to the Postal Service by lowering trans­
portation procurement costs should help produce Congressional support for 
the Postal Service position. What is the secret of airline success in Congress? 
Why has the Postal Service succeeded in eliminating the Insterstate 
Commerce Commission as a factor in its dealings with surface carriers but 
failed in its attempt to circumvent the Civil Aeronautics Board? 
Absent well-accepted and developed theories of regulation and Congres­
sional behavior, we can only speculate. An initially appealing answer to the 
questions presented might lie in the appeal of the status quo, especially when 
coupled with a combination of an existing government agency (the CAB) 
and intensely interested private parties (the scheduled carriers). But the 
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970 disturbed many existing relationships. 
And why could not the carriers who might benefit from expanded contract 
authority, such as supplementals or the more efficient scheduled carriers, 
form an equally effective coalition with a much larger government entity, 
the Postal Service? The suggestion that the answer lies in the combination of 
historical momentum mentioned previously and monopoly profits to support 
a private lobbying effort founders on the fact that the peculiar nature of 
airline regulation forces the carriers to expend monopoly profits in excess 
service quality.177 And in any event, why should the Civil Aeronautics 
Board and the air carriers have been treated differently from the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the surface carriers? Perhaps the answer lies in 
the committee structure of the Congress, as suggested in Part I. But surface 
carriers come under the same committee jurisdiction as air carriers. Why 
would the same committee structure produce inconsistent results? These 
questions suggest that recent efforts to discern theories of regulation, 
bureaucracy, and Congressional influence and behavior are not misplaced. 
Unfortunately, the theories are not yet sufficiently developed to allow 
confident analysis. 
177 G. W. Douglas & James C. Miller III, supra note 86. 
